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A GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MEAN FIELD LIMIT FOR
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
DANIEL LACKER
Abstract. The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is
derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal
assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may be asymmetric and based on full
information. It is shown that approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games admit certain
weak limits as n tends to infinity, and every limit is a weak solution of the mean field game
(MFG). Conversely, every weak MFG solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of
approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games. Thus, the MFG precisely characterizes the
possible limiting equilibrium behavior of the n-player games. Even in the setting without common
noise, the empirical state distributions may admit stochastic limits which cannot be described by
the usual notion of MFG solution.
1. Introduction
A decade of active research on mean field games (MFGs) has been driven by a primarily intuitive
connection with large-population stochastic differential games of a certain symmetric type. The idea,
which began with the pioneering work of Lasry and Lions [31] and Huang, Malhame´ and Caines [21],
is that a large-population game of this type should behave similarly to its MFG counterpart, which
may be thought of as an infinite-player version of the game. Rigorous analysis of this connection,
however, remains restricted in scope. Following [21], the vast majority of the literature works
backward from the mean field limit, in the sense that a solution of the MFG is used to construct
approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding n-player games for large n. Fewer papers [31,
15, 2, 14] have approached from the other direction: given for each n a Nash equilibrium for the
n-player game, in what sense (if any) do these equilibria converge as n tends to infinity? The goal
of this paper is to address both of these problems in a general framework.
More precisely, we study an n-player stochastic differential game, in which the private state
processes X1, . . . , Xn of the agents (or players) are given by the following dynamics:
dX it = b(t,X
i
t , µ̂
n
t , α
i
t)dt+ σ(t,X
i
t , µ̂
n
t )dW
i
t + σ0(t,X
i
t , µ̂
n
t )dBt,
µ̂nt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt .
Here B,W 1, . . . ,Wn are independent Wiener processes, αi is the control of agent i, and µ̂n is the
empirical distribution of the state processes. We call W 1, . . . ,Wn the independent or idiosyncratic
noises, since agent i feels only W i directly, and we call B the common noise, since each agent feels
B equally. The reward to agent i of the strategy profile (α1, . . . , αn) is
Ji(α
1, . . . , αn) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X it , µ̂
n
t , α
i
t)dt+ g(X
i
T , µ̂
n
T )
]
.
Agent i seeks to maximize this reward, and so we say that (α1, . . . , αn) form an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
(or an approximate Nash equilibrium) if
Ji(α
1, . . . , αn) + ǫ ≥ Ji(α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn)
for each admissible alternative strategy β. Intuitively, if the number of agents n is very large, a
single representative agent has little influence on the empirical measure flow (µ̂nt )t∈[0,T ], and so
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this agent expects to lose little in the way of optimality by ignoring her own effect on the empirical
measure. Crucially, the system is symmetric in the sense that the same functions (b, σ, σ0) and (f, g)
determine the dynamics and objectives of each agent, and thus we may hope to learn something of
the entire system from the behavior of a single representative agent.
The mean field game is specified precisely in Section 2, and it follows this intuition by treating
n as infinite. Loosely speaking, a strong MFG solution is a (FBt = σ(Bs : s ≤ t))t∈[0,T ]-adapted
measure-valued process (µt)t∈[0,T ] satisfying µt = Law(X
α∗
t | F
B
t ) for each t, where X
α∗ is an
optimally controlled state process coming from the following stochastic optimal control problem:{
α∗ ∈ argmaxα E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xαt , µt, αt)dt+ g(X
α
T , µT )
]
, s.t.
dXαt = b(t,X
α
t , µt, αt)dt+ σ(t,X
α
t , µt)dWt + σ0(t,X
α
t , µt)dBt.
In other words, with the process (µt)t∈[0,T ] treated as fixed, the representative agent solves an
optimal control problem. The requirement µt = Law(X
α∗
t | F
B
t ), often known as a consistency
condition, assures us that this decoupled optimal control problem is truly representative of the
entire population, and we may think of the measure flow (µt)t∈[0,T ] as an equilibrium.
The analysis of this paper focuses on mean field games with common noise, but both of the
volatility coefficients σ and σ0 are allowed to be degenerate. Hence, our results cover the usual
mean field games without common noise (where σ0 ≡ 0) as well as deterministic mean field games
(where σ ≡ σ0 ≡ 0). The literature on mean field games with common noise is quite scarce so far,
but some general analysis is provided in the recent papers [11, 1, 9, 5], and some specific models
were studied in [12, 19]. This paper can be seen as a sequel to [11], from which we borrow many
definitions and a handful of lemmas. It is emphasized in [11] that strong solutions are quite difficult
to obtain when common noise is present, and this leads to a notion of weak MFG solution. Weak
solutions, defined carefully in Section 2.2, differ most significantly from strong solutions in that the
measure flow (µt)t∈[0,T ] need not be (F
B
t )t∈[0,T ]-adapted, and the consistency condition is weakened
to something like µt = Law(X
α∗
t | F
B,µ
t ), where F
B,µ
t = σ(Bs, µs : s ≤ t). Additionally, weak MFG
solutions allow for relaxed (i.e. measure-valued) controls which need not be adapted to the filtration
generated by the inputs (X0, B,W, µ) of the control problem.
Although this weaker notion of MFG solution was introduced in [11] to develop an existence and
uniqueness theory for MFGs with common noise, the main result of this paper is to assert that this
notion is the right one from the point of view of the finite-player game, in the sense that weak MFG
solutions characterize the limits of approximate Nash equilibria. The main results are stated in full
generality in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, but let us state them loosely for now in a simplified form: First,
we show that if for each n we are given an ǫn-Nash equilibrium (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n) for the n-player
game, where ǫn → 0, then the family (Law(B, µ̂n))∞n=1 is tight, and every weak limit agrees with
the law of (B, µ) coming from some weak MFG solution. Second, we show conversely that every
weak MFG solution can be obtained as a limit in this way.
Specializing our results to the case without common noise uncovers something unexpected. In
the literature thus far, a MFG solution is defined in terms of a deterministic equilibrium (µt)t∈[0,T ],
corresponding to our notion of strong MFG solution. Even when there is no common noise, a weak
MFG solution still involves a stochastic equilibrium, and because of our main theorems we must
therefore expect the limits of the finite-player empirical measures to remain stochastic. Moreover, we
demonstrate by a simple example that a stochastic equilibrium is not necessarily just a randomization
among the family of deterministic equilibria. Hence, the solution concept considered thusfar in
literature on mean field games (without common noise) does not fully capture the limiting dynamics
of finite-player approximate Nash equilibria. This is unlike the case of McKean-Vlasov limits (see
[32, 16, 34]), which can be seen as mean field games with no control. We prove some admittedly
difficult-to-apply results which nevertheless shed some light on this phenomenon: The fundamental
obstruction is the adaptedness required of controls, which renders the class of admissible controls
quite sensitive to whether or not (µt)t∈[0,T ] is stochastic.
Our first theorem, regarding the convergence of arbitrary approximate equilibria (open-loop,
full-information, and possibly asymmetric), is arguably the more novel of our two main theorems.
It appears to be the first result of its kind for mean field games with common noise, with the exception
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of the linear quadratic model of [12] for which explicit computations are available. However, even
in the setting without common noise we subtantially generalize the few existing results.
Several papers, such as the recent [9] dealing with common noise, contain purely heuristic
derivations of the MFG as the limit of n-player games. The intuition guiding such derivations is
as follows (and let us assume there is no common noise for the sake of simplicity): If n is large, a
single agent in a large population should lose little in the way of optimality if she ignores the small
feedbacks arising through the empirical measure flow (µ̂nt )t∈[0,T ]. If each of the n identical agents
does this, then we expect to see symmetric strategies which are nearly independent and ideally
of the form αˆ(t,X it), for some feedback control αˆ common to all of the agents. From the theory
of McKean-Vlasov limits, we then expect that (µ̂nt )t∈[0,T ] converges to a deterministic limit. This
intuition, however, is largely unsubstantiated and, we will argue, inaccurate in general.
Lasry and Lions [31, 30] first attacked this problem rigorously using PDE methods, working with
an infinite time horizon and strong simplifying assumptions on the data, and their results were later
generalized by Feleqi [14]. Bardi and Priuli [2, 3] justified the MFG limit for certain linear-quadratic
problems, and Gomes et al. [17] studied models with finite state space. Substantial progress was
made in a very recent paper of Fischer [15], which deserves special mention also because both the
level of generality and the method of proof are quite similar to ours; we will return to this shortly.
With the exception of [15], the aforementioned results share the important limitation that the
agents have only partial information: the control of agent imay depend only on her own state process
Xn,i or Wiener process W i. Our results allow for arbitrary full-information strategies, settling a
conjecture of Lasry and Lions (stated in Remark x after [31, Theorem 2.3] for the case of infinite
time horizon). Combined in [31, 30, 14] with the assumption that the state process coefficients
(b, σ) do not depend on the empirical measure, the assumption of partial information leads to the
immensely useful simplification that the state processes of the n-player games are independent. By
showing then that they are also asymptotically identically distributed, the aforementioned heuristic
argument can be made precise.
Fischer [15], on the other hand, allows for full-information controls but characterizes only the
deterministic limits of (µ̂nt )t∈[0,T ] as MFG equilibria. Assuming that the limit is deterministic
implicitly restricts the class of n-player equilibria in question. By characterizing even the stochastic
limits of (µ̂nt )t∈[0,T ], which we show are in fact quite typical, we impose no such restriction on the
equilibrium strategies of the n-player games. This not to say, however, that our results completely
subsume those of [15], which work with a more general notion of local approximate equilibria and
which notably include conditions under which the assumption of a deterministic limit can be verified.
Our second main theorem, which asserts that every weak MFG solution is attainable as a limit
of finite-player approximate Nash equilibria, is something of an abstraction of the kind of limiting
result most commonly discussed in the MFG literature. In a tradition beginning with [21] and
continued by the majority of the probabilistic papers on the subject [8, 13, 6, 4, 27], an optimal
control from an MFG solution is used to construct approximate equilibria for the finite-player games.
Although our result applies in more general settings, our conclusions are duly weaker, in the sense
that the approximate equilibria we construct do not necessarily consist of particularly tangible
(i.e. distributed or even symmetric) strategies. We emphasize that the goal of this work is not to
construct nice approximate equilibria but rather to characterize all possible limits of approximate
equilibria.
It is worth emphasizing that this paper makes no claims whatsoever regarding the existence or
uniqueness of equilibria for either the n-player game or the MFG. Rather, we show that if a sequence
of n-player approximate equilibria exists, then its limits are described by weak MFG solutions.
Conversely, if a weak MFG solution exists, then it is achieved as the limit of some sequence of
n-player approximate equilibria. Hence, existence of a weak MFG solution is equivalent to existence
of a sequence of n-player approximate equilibria. Note, however, that the main assumption A of
this paper actually guarantees the existence of a weak MFG solution, because of the recent results
of [11]. Far more results are available for MFGs without common noise; refer to the surveys [7, 18]
and the recent book [4] for a wealth of wellposedness results and for further discussion of MFG
theory in general.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the MFG and the corresponding n-player
games, before stating the main limit Theorem 2.6 and its converse, Theorem 2.11, along with several
useful corollaries. Section 3 specializes the results to the more familiar setting without common noise
and explains the gap between weak and strong solutions. Section 4 provides some background on
weak solutions of MFGs with common noise, borrowed from [11], before we turn to the proofs of the
main results in Sections 5, 6, and 7. Section 5 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.6, while Section
6 contains the proof of the converse Theorem 2.11. Finally, Section 7 explains how to carefully
specialize these two theorems to the setting without common noise.
2. The mean field limit with common noise
After establishing some notation, this section first defines quickly and concisely the mean field
game. We work with the same definitions and nearly the same assumptions as [11], to which the
reader is referred for a more thorough discussion. Then, the n-player game is formulated precisely,
allowing for somewhat more general information structures than one usually finds in the literature
on stochastic differential games. This generality is not just for its own sake; it will play a crucial
role in the proofs later.
2.1. Notation and standing assumptions. For a topological space E, let B(E) denote the Borel
σ-field, and let P(E) denote the set of Borel probability measures on E. For p ≥ 1 and a separable
metric space (E, d), let Pp(E) denote the set of µ ∈ P(E) satisfying
∫
E d
p(x, x0)µ(dx) < ∞ for
some (and thus for any) x0 ∈ E. Let ℓE,p denote the p-Wasserstein distance on Pp(E), given by
ℓE,p(µ, ν) := inf
{(∫
E×E
γ(dx, dy)dp(x, y)
)1/p
: γ ∈ P(E × E) has marginals µ, ν
}
(2.1)
Unless otherwise stated, the space Pp(E) is equipped with the metric ℓE,p, and all continuity and
measurability statements involving Pp(E) are with respect to ℓE,p and the corresponding Borel σ-
field. The analysis of the paper will make routine use of several topological properties of the spaces
Pp(E) and Pp(Pp(E)), especially when E is a product space. All of the results we need, well known
or not, are summarized in the Appendices A and B of [29].
We are given a time horizon T > 0, three exponents (p′, p, pσ) with p ≥ 1, a control space A,
an initial state distribution λ ∈ P(Rd), and the following functions:
(b, f) : [0, T ]× Rd × Pp(Rd)×A→ Rd × R,
(σ, σ0) : [0, T ]× R
d × Pp(Rd)→ Rd×m × Rd×m0 ,
g : Rd × Pp(Rd)→ R.
Assume throughout the paper that the following assumption A holds. This is exactly Assumption
A of [11], except that here we require that p′ ≥ 2 and that (b, σ, σ0) are Lipschitz not only in the
state argument but also in the measure argument.
Assumption A.
(A.1) A is a closed subset of a Euclidean space. (More generally, as in [20], a closed σ-compact
subset of a Banach space would suffice.)
(A.2) The exponents satisfy p′ > p ≥ 1 ∨ pσ and p′ ≥ 2 ≥ pσ ≥ 0, and also λ ∈ Pp
′
(Rd).
(A.3) The functions b, σ, σ0, f , and g of (t, x, µ, a) are jointly measurable and are continuous in
(x, µ, a) for each t.
(A.4) There exists c1 > 0 such that, for all (t, x, y, µ, ν, a) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×Rd×Pp(Rd)×Pp(Rd)×A,
|b(t, x, µ, a)− b(t, y, ν, a)|+ |(σ, σ0)(t, x, µ)− (σ, σ0)(t, y, ν)| ≤ c1
(
|x− y|+ ℓRd,p(µ, ν)
)
,
and
|b(t, 0, δ0, a)| ≤ c1(1 + |a|),
|(σσ + σ0σ
⊤
0 )(t, x, µ)| ≤ c1
[
1 + |x|pσ +
(∫
Rd
|z|pµ(dz)
)pσ/p]
.
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(A.5) There exist c2, c3 > 0 such that, for each (t, x, µ, a) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Pp(Rd)×A,
|g(x, µ)| ≤ c2
(
1 + |x|p +
∫
Rd
|z|pµ(dz)
)
,
−c2
(
1 + |x|p +
∫
Rd
|z|pµ(dz) + |a|p
′
)
≤ f(t, x, µ, a) ≤ c2
(
1 + |x|p +
∫
Rd
|z|pµ(dz)
)
− c3|a|
p′ .
While these assumptions are fairly general, they do not cover all linear-quadratic models. Be-
cause of the requirement p′ > p, the running objectve f may grow quadratically in a only if its
growth in (x, µ) is strictly subquadratic. This requirement is important for compactness purposes,
both for the results of this paper and for the existence results of [29, 11]. In fact, [29, 11] provide
examples of MFGs with p′ = p which do not admit solutions even though they verify the rest of
assumption A. Existence results for this somewhat delicate boundary case have been obtained in
[8, 10, 6, 12] by assuming some additional inequalities between coefficients. It seems feasible to
expect our main results to adapt to such settings, but we do not pursue this here.
2.2. Relaxed controls and mean field games. Define V to be the set of measures q on [0, T ]×A
with first marginal equal to Lebesgue measure, i.e. q([s, t]×A) = t− s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying
also ∫
[0,T ]×A
|a|pq(dt, da) <∞.
Since these measures have mass T , we may endow V with a suitable scaling of the p-Wasserstein
metric. Each q ∈ V may be identified with a measurable function [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ qt ∈ Pp(A),
determined uniquely (up to a.e. equality) by dtqt(da) = q(dt, da). It is known that V is a Polish
space, and in fact if A is compact then so is V ; see [29, Appendix A] for more details. The elements
of V are called relaxed controls, and q ∈ V is called a strict control if it satisfies q(dt, da) = dtδαt(da)
for some measurable function [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ αt ∈ A. Finally, if we are given a measurable process
(Λt)t∈[0,T ] with values in P(A) defined on some measurable space and with
∫ T
0
∫
A |a|
pΛt(da)dt <∞,
we write Λ = dtΛt(da) for the corresponding random element of V .
Let us define some additional canonical spaces. For a positive integer k let Ck = C([0, T ];Rk)
denote the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] to Rk, and define the truncated supremum norms
‖ · ‖t on Ck by
‖x‖t := sup
s∈[0,t]
|xs|, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.2)
Unless otherwise stated, Ck is endowed with the norm ‖ · ‖T and its Borel σ-field. For µ ∈ P(Ck),
let µt ∈ P(Rk) denote the image of µ under the map x 7→ xt. Let
X := Cm × V × Cd. (2.3)
This space will house the idiosyncratic noise, the relaxed control, and the state process. Let
(FXt )t∈[0,T ] denote the canonical filtration on X , where F
X
t is the σ-field generated by the maps
X ∋ (w, q, x) 7→ (ws, xs, q([0, s]× C)) ∈ R
m × Rd × R, for s ≤ t, C ∈ B(A).
For µ ∈ P(X ), let µx := µ(Cm × V × ·) denote the Cd-marginal. Finally, for ease of notation let us
define the objective functional Γ : Pp(Cd)× V × Cd → R by
Γ(µ, q, x) :=
∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, xt, µt, a)qt(da)dt+ g(xT , µT ). (2.4)
The following definition of weak mean field game (MFG) solution is borrowed from [11].
Definition 2.1. A weak MFG solution with weak control (with initial state distribution λ), or
simply a weak MFG solution, is a tuple (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X), where (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) is
a complete filtered probability space supporting (B,W, µ,Λ, X) satisfying
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(1) (Bt)t∈[0,T ] and (Wt)t∈[0,T ] are independent (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener processes of respective di-
mension m0 and m, the process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-adapted with values in R
d, and
P ◦X−10 = λ. Moreover, µ is a random element of P
p(X ) such that µ(C) is Ft-measurable
for each C ∈ FXt and t ∈ [0, T ].
(2) X0, W , and (B, µ) are independent.
(3) (Λt)t∈[0,T ] is (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt <∞.
Moreover, σ(Λs : s ≤ t) is conditionally independent of F
X0,B,W,µ
T given F
X0,B,W,µ
t , for each
t ∈ [0, T ], where
FX0,B,W,µt = σ
(
X0, Bs,Ws, µ(C) : s ≤ t, C ∈ F
X
t
)
.
(4) The state equation holds:
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µ
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt + σ(t,Xt, µ
x
t )dWt + σ0(t,Xt, µ
x
t )dBt. (2.5)
(5) If (Ω˜′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′) is another filtered probability space supporting (B′,W ′, µ′,Λ′, X ′)
satisfying (1-4) and P ◦ (B, µ)−1 = P ′ ◦ (B′, µ′)−1, then
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP
′
[Γ(µ′x,Λ′, X ′)] .
(6) µ is a version of the conditional law of (W,Λ, X) given (B, µ).
If also there exists an A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ] such that P (Λt = δαt a.e. t) = 1, then we say the
weak MFG solution has strict control. If this (αt)t∈[0,T ] is progressively measurable with respect
to the completion of (FX0,B,W,µt )t∈[0,T ], we say the weak MFG solution has strong control. If µ is
a.s. B-measurable, then we have a strong MFG solution (with either weak control, strict control,
or strong control).
Given a weak MFG solution (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X), we may view (X0, B,W, µ,Λ, X)
as a random element of the canonical space
Ω := Rd × Cm0 × Cm × Pp(X ) × V × Cd. (2.6)
A weak MFG solution thus induces a probability measure on Ω, which itself we would like to call a
MFG solution, as it is really the object of interest more than the particular probability space. The
following definition will be reformulated in Section 4 in a more intrinsic manner.
Definition 2.2. If P ∈ P(Ω) satisfies P = P ′ ◦ (X0, B,W, µ,Λ, X)−1 for some weak MFG solution
(Ω′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′, B,W, µ,Λ, X), then we refer to P itself as a weak MFG solution. Naturally, we
may also refer to P as a weak MFG solution with strict control or strong control, or as a strong
MFG solution, under the analogous additional assumptions.
2.3. Finite-player games. This section describes a general form of the finite-player games, allow-
ing controls to be relaxed and adapted to general filtrations.
An n-player environment is defined to be any tuple En = (Ωn, (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ), where
(Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn) is a complete filtered probability space supporting an F
n
0 -measurable (R
d)n-
valued random variable ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) with law λ×n, an m0-dimensional (Fnt )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener pro-
cess B, and a nm-dimensional (Fnt )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process W = (W
1, . . . ,Wn), independent of B.
For simplicity, we consider i.i.d. initial states ξ1, . . . , ξn with common law λ, although it is presum-
ably possible to generalize this. Perhaps all of the notation here should be parametrized by En or
an additional index for n, but, since we will typically focus on a fixed sequence of environments
(En)∞n=1, we avoid complicating the notation. Indeed, the subscript n on the measure Pn will be
enough to remind us on which environment we are working at any moment.
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Until further notice, we work with a fixed n-player environment En. An admissible control is
any (Fnt )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable P(A)-valued process (Λt)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt <∞.
An admissible strategy is a vector of n admissible controls. The set of admissible controls is de-
noted An(En), and accordingly the set of admissible strategies is the Cartesian product Ann(En). A
strict control is any control Λ ∈ An(En) such that Pn(Λt = δαt , a.e. t) = 1 for some (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ]-
progressively measurable A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ], and a strict strategy is any vector of n strict
controls. Given an admissible control Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Ann(En) define the state processes
X [Λ] := (X1[Λ], . . . , Xn[Λ]) by
dX it [Λ] =
∫
A
b(t,X it [Λ], µ̂
x
t [Λ], a)Λ
i
t(da)dt + σ(t,X
i
t [Λ], µ̂
x
t [Λ])dW
i
t
+ σ0(t,X
i
t [Λ], µ̂
x
t [Λ])dBt, X
i
0 = ξ
i,
µ̂x[Λ] :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXk[Λ].
Note that assumption A ensures that a unique strong solution of this SDE system exists1. Indeed,
the Lipschitz assumption of (A.4) and the obvious inequality
ℓp
Rd,p
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxi ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
δyi
)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
|xi − yi|
p
together imply, for example, that the function
(Rd)n ∋ (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ b
(
t, x1,
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxi , a
)
∈ Rd
is Lipschitz, uniformly in (t, a). A standard estimate using assumption (A.4), which is worked out
in Lemma 5.1, shows that EPn [‖X i[Λ]‖pT ] <∞ for each Λ ∈ A
n
n(En), n ≥ i ≥ 1.
The value for player i corresponding to a strategy Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Ann(En) is defined by
Ji(Λ) := E
Pn
[
Γ(µ̂x[Λ],Λi, X it [Λ])
]
.
Note that Ji(Λ) < ∞ is well-defined because of the upper bounds of assumption (A.5), but it is
possible that Ji(Λ) = −∞, since we do not require that an admissible control possess finite moment
of order p′. Given a strategy Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Ann(En) and a control β ∈ An(En), define a new
strategy (Λ−i, β) ∈ Ann(En) by
(Λ−i, β) = (Λ1, . . . ,Λi−1, β,Λi+1, . . . ,Λn).
Given ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) ∈ [0,∞)
n, a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium in En is any strategy Λ ∈ A
n
n(En)
satisfying
Ji(Λ) ≥ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
−i, β))− ǫi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Naturally, if ǫi = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n, we use the simpler term Nash equilibrium, as opposed to
0-Nash equilibrium. A strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium in En is any strict strategy Λ ∈ Ann(En) satisfying
Ji(Λ) ≥ sup
β∈An(En) strict
Ji((Λ
−i, β)) − ǫi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that the optimality is required only among strict controls.
Note that the role of the filtration (Fnt )t∈[0,T ] in the environment En is mainly to specify the
class of admissible controls. We are particularly interested in the sub-filtration generated by the
Wiener processes and initial states; define (Fs,nt )t∈[0,T ] to be the Pn-completion of
(σ(ξ, Bs,Ws : s ≤ t))t∈[0,T ] .
1As in [11], we avoid augmenting the filtrations to be right-continuous, taking advantage of the careful treatment
of stochastic integration of [33, Section 4.3].
8 DANIEL LACKER
Of course, Fs,nt ⊂ F
n
t for each t. Let us say that Λ ∈ An(En) is a strong control if Pn(Λt =
δαt a.e. t) = 1 for some (F
s,n
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ]. Natu-
rally, a strong strategy is a vector of strong controls. A strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium in En is any strong
strategy Λ ∈ Ann(En) such that
Ji(Λ) ≥ sup
β∈An(En) strong
Ji((Λ
−i, β))− ǫi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.3. Equivalently, a strong ǫ-Nash equilbrium in En = (Ωn, (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ) is a
strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium in E˜n := (Ωn, (F
s,n
t )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ).
The most common type of Nash equilibrium considered in the literature is, in our terminology, a
strong Nash equilibrium. The next proposition assures us that our equilibrium concept using relaxed
controls (and general filtrations) truly generalizes this more standard situation, thus permitting a
unified analysis of all of the equilibria described thusfar. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.4. On any n-player environment En, every strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a strict
ǫ-Nash equilibrium, and every strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2.5. Another common type of strategy in dynamic game theory is called closed-loop.
Whereas our strategies (also called open-loop) are specified by processes, a closed-loop (strict) strat-
egy is specified by feedback functions φi : [0, T ]× (Rd)n → A, for i = 1, . . . , n, to be evaluated along
the path of the state process. In the model of Carmona et al. [12], both the open-loop and closed-
loop equilibria are computed explicitly for the n-player games, and they are shown to converge to
the same MFG limit. There is no distinction between open-loop and closed-loop in the MFG, and
this begs the question of whether or not closed-loop equilibria converge to the same MFG limit that
we obtain in Theorem 2.6. This paper does not attempt to answer this question.
2.4. The main limit theorem. We are ready now to state the first main Theorem 2.6 and its
corollaries. The proof is deferred to Section 5. Given an admissible strategy Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈
Ann(En) defined on some n-player environment En = (Ωn, (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ), define (on Ωn)
the random element µ̂[Λ] of Pp(X ) (recalling the definition of X from (2.3)) by
µ̂[Λ] :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(W i,Λi,Xi[Λ]).
As usual, we identify a P(A)-valued process (Λit)t∈[0,T ] with the random element Λ
i = dtΛit(da) of
V . Recall the definition of the canonical space Ω from (2.6).
Theorem 2.6. Suppose assumption A holds. For each n, let ǫn = (ǫn1 , . . . , ǫ
n
n) ∈ [0,∞)
n, and let
En = (Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ) be any n-player environment. Assume
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
ǫni = 0. (2.7)
Suppose for each n that Λn = (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n) ∈ Ann(En) is a relaxed ǫ
n-Nash equilibrium, and let
Pn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦
(
ξi, B,W i, µ̂[Λn],Λn,i, X i[Λn]
)−1
. (2.8)
Then (Pn)
∞
n=1 is relatively compact in P
p(Ω), and each limit point is a weak MFG solution.
Remark 2.7. Averaging over i = 1, . . . , n in (2.8) circumvents the problem that the strategies
(Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n) need not be exchangeable, and we note that the limiting behavior of Pn◦(B, µ̂[Λn])−1
can always be recovered from that of Pn. To interpret the definition of Pn, note that we may write
Pn = Pn ◦
(
ξUn , B,WUn , µ̂[Λn],Λn,Un , XUn [Λn]
)−1
,
where Un is a random variable independent of FnT , uniformly distributed among {1, . . . , n}, con-
structed by extending the probability space Ωn. In words, Pn is the joint law of the processes
relevant to a randomly selected representative agent. Of course, Theorem 2.6 specializes when there
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is exchangeability, in the following sense. For any set E, any element e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ En, and
any permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, let epi := (epi(1), . . . , epi(n)). If
Pn ◦ (ξpi, B,Wpi ,Λ
n
pi)
−1
is independent of the choice of permutation π, then so is
Pn ◦ (ξpi , B,Wpi, µ̂[Λ
n
pi],Λ
n
pi, X [Λ
n
pi]pi)
−1
.
It then follows that
Pn = Pn ◦
(
ξk, B,W k, µ̂[Λn],Λn,k, Xk[Λn]
)−1
, for n ≥ k.
Theorem 2.6 is stated in quite a bit of generality, devoid even of standard convexity assumptions
on the objective functions f and g. Theorem 2.6 includes quite degenerate cases, such as the case of
no objectives, where f ≡ g ≡ 0 and A is compact. In this case, any strategy profile whatsoever in the
n-player game is a Nash equilibrium, and any weak control can arise in the limit. Exploiting results
of [11], the following corollaries demonstrate how, under various additional convexity assumptions,
we may refine the conclusion of Theorem 2.6 by ruling out certain types of limits, such as those
involving relaxed controls.
Corollary 2.8. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 hold, and assume also that for each
(t, x, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Pp(Rd) the following subset of Rd × R is convex:
{(b(t, x, µ, a), z) : a ∈ A, z ≤ f(t, x, µ, a)} .
Then {
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦
(
B,W i, µ̂x[Λn], X i[Λn]
)−1
: n ≥ 1
}
is relatively compact in Pp(Cm0×Cm×Pp(Cd)×Cd), and every limit is of the form P◦(B,W, µx, X)−1,
for some weak MFG solution with strict control (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.6 and the argument of [11, Theorem 4.1]. Indeed, the latter
shows that for every weak MFG solution with weak control (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X), there
exists a weak MFG solution with strict control (Ω˜′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′, B′,W ′, µ′,Λ′, X ′) such that P ◦
(B,W, µx, X)−1 = P ′ ◦ (B′,W ′, µ′x, X ′)−1. 
Corollary 2.9. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 hold, and define Pn as in (2.8). Assume
also that for each fixed (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ] × Pp(Rd), (b, σ, σ0)(t, x, µ, a) is affine in (x, a), g(x, µ) is
concave in x, and f(t, x, µ, a) is strictly concave in (x, a). Then (Pn)
∞
n=1 is relatively compact in
Pp(Ω), and every limit point is a weak MFG solution with strong control.
Proof. By [11, Proposition 4.4], the present assumptions guarantee that every weak MFG solution
is a weak MFG solution with strong control. The claim then follows from Theorem 2.6. 
Finally, we provide an example of the satisfying situation, in which there is a unique MFG
solution. Say that uniqueness in law holds for the MFG if any two weak MFG solutions induce
the same law on Ω. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.6 and the
uniqueness result of [11, Theorem 6.2], which makes use of the monotonicity assumption of Lasry
and Lions [31].
Corollary 2.10. Suppose the assumptions of Corollary 2.9 hold, and define Pn as in (2.8). Assume
also that
(1) b, σ, and σ0 have no mean field term, i.e. no µ dependence,
(2) f is of the form f(t, x, µ, a) = f1(t, x, a) + f2(t, x, µ),
(3) For each µ, ν ∈ Pp(Cd) we have∫
Cd
(µ− ν)(dx)
[
g(xT , µT )− g(xT , νT ) +
∫ T
0
(f2(t, x, µ)− f2(t, x, ν)) dt
]
≤ 0.
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Then there exists a unique in law weak MFG solution, and it is a strong MFG solution with strong
control. In particular, Pn converges in Pp(Ω) to this unique MFG solution.
2.5. The converse limit theorem. This section states and discusses a converse to Theorem 2.6.
For this, we need an additional technical assumption, which we note holds automatically under
assumption A in the case that the control space A is compact.
Assumption B. The function f of (t, x, µ, a) is continuous in (x, µ), uniformly in a, for each
t ∈ [0, T ]. That is,
lim
(x′,µ′)→(x,µ)
sup
a∈A
|f(t, x′, µ′, a)− f(t, x, µ, a)| = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, there exists c4 > 0 such that, for all (t, x, x
′, µ, µ′, a),
|f(t, x′, µ′, a)− f(t, x, µ, a)| ≤ c4
(
1 + |x′|p + |x|p +
∫
Rd
|z|p(µ′ + µ)(dz)
)
.
Theorem 2.11. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Let P ∈ P(Ω) be a weak MFG solution, and
for each n let En = (Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ) be any n-player environment. Then there exist, for
each n, ǫn ≥ 0 and a strong (ǫn, . . . , ǫn)-Nash equilibrium Λn = (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n) on En, such that
limn→∞ ǫn = 0 and
P = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦
(
ξi, B,W i, µ̂[Λn],Λn,i, X i[Λn]
)−1
, in Pp(Ω). (2.9)
Combining Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 shows that the set of weak MFG solutions is exactly the set
of limits of strong approximate Nash equilibria. More precisely, the set of weak MFG solutions is
exactly the set of limits
lim
k→∞
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
Pnk ◦
(
ξi, B,W i, µ̂[Λnk ],Λnk,i, X i[Λnk ]
)−1
,
where Λn ∈ Ann(En) are strong ǫ
n-Nash equilibria and ǫn = (ǫn1 , . . . , ǫ
n
n) ∈ [0,∞)
n satisfies (2.7).
The same statement is true when the word “strong” is replaced by “strict” or “relaxed”, because of
Proposition 2.4. Similarly, combining Theorem 2.11 with Corollaries 2.8 and 2.9 yields characteri-
zations of the mean field limit without recourse to relaxed controls.
Remark 2.12. In light of Remark 2.3, the statement of Theorem 2.11 is insensitive to the choice
of environments En. Without loss of generality, they may all be assumed to satisy Fnt = F
s,n
t for
each t; that is, the filtration may be taken to be the one generated by the process (ξ, Bt,Wt)t∈[0,T ].
Remark 2.13. It follows from the proofs of Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 that the values converge as
well, in the sense that 1n
∑n
i=1 Ji(Λ
n) converges (along a subsequence in the case of Theorem 2.6)
to the corresponding optimal value corresponding to the MFG solution.
Remark 2.14. Theorem 2.11 is admittedly abstract, and not as strong in its conclusion as the
typical results of this nature in the literature. Namely, in the setting without common noise, it is
usually argued as in [21] that a MFG solution may be used to construct not just any sequence of
approximate equilibria, but rather one consisting of symmetric distributed strategies, in which the
control of agent i is of the form αˆ(t,X it) for some function αˆ which depends neither on the agent i
nor the number of agents n. The techniques of this paper seem too abstract to yield a result of this
nature, but in any case this would stray from the objective of the paper. On a somewhat related
note, at the level of generality of Theorem 2.11 we do not expect to obtain a rate of convergence of
ǫn, as in [27, 8].
3. The case of no common noise
The goal of this section is to specialize the main results to MFGs without common noise. Indeed
we assume that σ0 ≡ 0 throughout this section. Assumption A permits degenerate volatility, but
when σ0 ≡ 0 our general definition of weak MFG solution still involves the common noise B, which
in a sense should no longer play any role. To be absolutely clear, we will rewrite the definitions and
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the two main theorems so that they do not involve a common noise; most notably, the notion of
strong controls for the finite-player games is refined to very strong controls.
The proofs of the main results of Section 3.1, Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.4, are deferred to
Section 7, where we will see how to deduce almost all of the results without common noise from those
with common noise. Crucially, even without common noise, a weak MFG solution still involves a
random measure µ, and the consistency condition becomes µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ). We illustrate
by example just how different weak solutions can be from the strong solutions typically considered
in the MFG literature, in which µ is deterministic. Finally we close the section by discussing some
situations in which weak solutions are concentrated on the family of strong solutions.
3.1. Definitions and results. First, let us state a simplified definition of MFG solution for the
case σ0 ≡ 0, which is really just Definition 2.1 rewritten without B. Again, the following definition
is relative to the initial state distribution λ.
Definition 3.1. A weak MFG solution without common noise is a tuple (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X),
where (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) is a complete filtered probability space supporting (W,µ,Λ, X) satisfying
(1) (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is an (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener processes of dimension m, the process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is
(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-adapted with values in R
d, and P ◦X−10 = λ. Moreover, µ is a random element
of Pp(X ) such that µ(C) is Ft-measurable for each C ∈ FXt and t ∈ [0, T ].
(2) X0, W , and µ are independent.
(3) (Λt)t∈[0,T ] is (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt <∞.
Moreover, σ(Λs : s ≤ t) is conditionally independent of F
X0,W,µ
T given F
X0,W,µ
t , for each
t ∈ [0, T ], where
FX0,W,µt = σ
(
X0,Ws, µ(C) : s ≤ t, C ∈ F
X
t
)
.
(4) The state equation holds:
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µ
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt + σ(t,Xt, µ
x
t )dWt. (3.1)
(5) If (Ω˜′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′) is another filtered probability space supporting (W ′, µ′,Λ′, X ′) satis-
fying (1-4) and P ◦ µ−1 = P ′ ◦ (µ′)−1, then
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP
′
[Γ(µ′x,Λ′, X ′)] .
(6) µ is a version of the conditional law of (W,Λ, X) given µ.
As in Definition 2.2, we may refer to the law P ◦ (W,µ,Λ, X)−1 itself as a weak MFG solution.
Again, if also there exists an A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ] such that P (Λt = δαt a.e. t) = 1, then we
say the MFG solution has strict control. If this (αt)t∈[0,T ] is progressively measurable with respect
to the completion of (FX0,W,µt )t∈[0,T ], we say the MFG solution has strong control. If µ is a.s.-
constant, then we have a strong MFG solution without common noise. In this case, we may abuse
the terminology somewhat by saying that a measure µ˜ ∈ Pp(X ) is itself a strong MFG solution
(without common noise), if there exists a weak MFG solution (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) without
common noise such that P (µ = µ˜) = 1.
Remark 3.2. Our notion of strong MFG solution without common noise with strong control cor-
responds to the usual definition of MFG solution in the literature. It is exactly the definition used
in the recent papers [15, 29], and it is a generalization of the more standard definition of MFG
solution without common noise found in [21, 8, 6], for example. The latter papers require optimal-
ity only relative to other strong controls, not among all weak controls as we do in condition (5) of
Definition 3.1. Under assumption A, however, optimality among strong controls implies optimality
among weak controls, and thus our definition does include this more standard one. This is the same
phenomenon driving Propositions 2.4 and 3.3, and it is well known in control theory. Remark 6.5
will elaborate on this point, and see also [24] or the more recent [26] for further dicussion.
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We continue to work with the definition of the n-player games of the previous section. Suppose
we are given an n-player environment En = (Ω˜n, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ), as was defined in Section
2.3. Let (Fvs,nt )t∈[0,T ] denote the Pn-completion of (σ(ξ,Ws : s ≤ t))t∈[0,T ], that is the filtration
generated by the initial state and the idiosyncratic noises (but not the common noise). Let us say
that a control Λ ∈ An(En) is a very strong control if Pn(Λt = δαt a.e. t) = 1, for some (F
vs,n
t )t∈[0,T ]-
progressively measurable A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ]. A very strong strategy is a vector of strong
controls. For ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) ∈ [0,∞)n, a very strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium in En is any very strong
strategy Λ ∈ Ann(En) such that
Ji(Λ) ≥ sup
β∈An(En) very strong
Ji((Λ
−i, β))− ǫi, i = 1, . . . , n.
The very strong equilibrium is arguably the most natural notion of equilibrium in the case of no
common noise, and it is certainly one of the most common in the literature. The proof of the
following Proposition is deferred to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3.3. When σ0 ≡ 0, every very strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
The following Theorem 3.4 rewrites Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 in the setting without common noise.
Although this is mostly derived from Theorems 2.6 and 2.11, the proof is spelled out in Section 7,
as it is not entirely straightforward.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose σ0 ≡ 0. Theorem 2.6 remains true if the term “weak MFG solution” is
replaced by “weak MFG solution without common noise,” and if Pn is defined instead by
Pn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦
(
ξi,W i, µ̂[Λn],Λn,i, X i[Λn]
)−1
. (3.2)
Theorem 2.11 remains true if “weak MFG solution” is replaced by “weak MFG solution without
common noise,” if Pn is defined by (3.2), and if “strong” is replaced by “very strong.”
Since strong MFG solutions are more familiar in the literature on mean field games and pre-
sumably more accessible computationally, it would be nice to have a description of weak solutions
in terms of strong solutions. We will see that this is not possible in general, and the investigation of
this issue highlights the fundamental difference between stochastic and deterministic equilibria (i.e.
weak and strong MFG solutions). First, a discussion of a special case will help to clarify the ideas.
3.2. A digression on McKean-Vlasov equations. When there is no control (when A is a sin-
gleton), the mean field game reduces to a McKean-Vlasov equation. In this case, an interesting
simplification occurs: every weak solution is simply a randomization over strong solutions. To be
more clear, suppose we have a system of weakly interacting diffusions, given by
dX it = b˜(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t )dt+ σ˜(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t )dW
i
t ,
µn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXk .
A common argument in the theory of McKean-Vlasov limits [32, 16, 34] is to show, under suit-
able assumptions on (b˜, σ˜), that (µn)∞n=1 is tight, and that every weak limit point (an element of
P(P(Cd))) is concentrated on the set of solutions µ ∈ P(Cd) of the following strong McKean-Vlasov
equation: {
dXt = b˜(t,Xt, µt)dt+ σ˜(t,Xt, µt)dWt,
µ = Law(X).
Consider also searching for a P(Cd)-valued random variable µ satisfying the weak McKean-Vlasov
equation: {
dXt = b˜(t,Xt, µt)dt+ σ˜(t,Xt, µt)dWt,
µ = Law(X | µ), with X0, µ,W independent,
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It is not too difficult to convince yourself that a P(Cd)-valued random variable satisfies the weak
McKean-Vlasov equation if and only if it almost surely satisfies the strong McKean-Vlasov equation.
That is, every weak solution is supported on the set of strong solutions. In particular, we find that
the set of strong McKean-Vlasov solutions is rich enough to characterize all of the possible limiting
behaviors of the finite-particle systems.
In general, no such simplification is available for mean field games. This is essentially because
the adaptedness requirement makes the class of admissible controls quite dependent on how random
µ is. To highlight this point, Section 3.3 below describes a model possessing weak MFG solutions
which are not randomizations of strong MFG solutions. Subsection 3.4 discusses some partial results
on when this simplification can occur in the MFG setting.
3.3. An illuminating example. This section describes a deceptively simple example which illus-
trates the difference between weak and strong solutions. Consider the time horizon T = 2, the initial
state distribution λ = δ0, and the following data (still with σ0 ≡ 0):
b(t, x, ν, a) = a, σ constant, A = [−1, 1]
g(x, ν) = xν¯, f ≡ 0,
where for ν ∈ P1(R) we define ν¯ :=
∫
xν(dx). Similarly, for µ ∈ P1(X ) write µ¯xt :=
∫
R
xµxt (dx).
Assumption A is verified by choosing p = 2, pσ = 0, and any p
′ > 2. Let us first study the
optimization problems arising in the MFG problem. Let (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,2], P,W, µ,Λ, X) satisfy (1-5)
of Definition 3.1. For (Ft)t∈[0,2]-progressively measurable P([−1, 1])-valued processes β = (βt)t∈[0,2],
define
J˜(β) := E
[
Xβ2 µ¯
x
2
]
,
where
Xβt =
∫ t
0
∫
[−1,1]
aβt(da)dt + σWt, t ∈ [0, 2].
Independence of W and µ implies
J˜(β) = E
[∫ 2
0
∫
[−1,1]
aµ¯x2βt(da)dt
]
= E
[∫ 2
0
∫
[−1,1]
aEP [µ¯x2 | F
β
t ]βt(da)dt
]
,
where Fβt := σ(βs : s ≤ t). If it is also required that F
β
t is conditionally independent of F
X0,W,µ
2
given FX0,W,µt , then
E
P [µ¯x2 | F
β
t ] = E
P [µ¯x2 | F
X0,W,µ
t ] = E
P [µ¯x2 | F
µ
t ],
where the last equality follows from independence of (X0,W ) and µ, and F
µ
t := σ(µ(C) : C ∈ F
X
t ).
Hence
J˜(β) = E
[∫ 2
0
∫
[−1,1]
aEP [µ¯x2 | F
µ
t ]βt(da)dt
]
. (3.3)
Condition (5) of Definition 3.1 implies that Λ maximizes J over all such processes β, which implies
that Λt(ω) must equal δα∗t (ω) on the (t, ω)-set {α
∗ 6= 0}, where
α∗t := sign (E [ µ¯
x
2 | F
µ
t ]) ,
and we use the convention sign(0) := 0.
Remark 3.5. This already highlights the key point: When µ is deterministic, an optimal control
is the constant sign(µ¯x2), but when µ is random, this control is inadmissible since it is not adapted.
Proposition 3.6. Every strong MFG solution (without common noise) satisfies µ¯x2 ∈ {−2, 0, 2}
and µ¯xt = t sign(µ¯
x
2).
Proof. Let (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,2], P,W, µ,Λ, X) satisfy Definition 3.1, with µ deterministic. In this case,
α∗t = sign(µ¯
x
2) for all t. Suppose that µ¯
x
2 6= 0. Then Λt = δα∗t must hold dt⊗ dP -a.e., and thus
Xt = t sign(µ¯
x
2 ) + σWt, t ∈ [0, 2].
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The consistency condition (6) of Definition 3.1 implies µ¯xt = E[Xt] = t sign(µ¯
x
2). In particular,
µ¯x2 = 2 sign(µ¯
x
2), which implies µ¯
x
2 = ±2 since we assumed µ¯
x
2 6= 0. 
Proposition 3.7. There exists a weak MFG solution (without common noise) satisfying P (µ¯x2 =
1) = P (µ¯x2 = −1) = 1/2.
Proof. Construct on some probability space (Ω˜,F , P ) a random variable γ with P (γ = 1) = P (γ =
−1) = 1/2 and an independent Wiener process W . Let α∗t = γ1(1,2](t) for each t (noticing that
this interval is open on the left), and define (Ft)t∈[0,2] to be the complete filtration generated by
(Wt, α
∗
t )t∈[0,2]. Let
Xt :=
∫ t
0
α∗sds+ σWt = (t− 1)γ1(1,2](t) + σWt, t ∈ [0, 2].
Finally, let Λ = dtδα∗t (da), and define µ := P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | γ). Clearly µ is γ-measurable. On the
other hand, independence of γ and W implies
µ¯x2 = E[X2 | γ] = γ.
Thus γ is also µ-measurable, and we conclude that µ := P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ). It is straightforward
to check that
Fµt =
{
{∅, Ω˜} if t ≤ 1
σ(γ) if 1 < t ≤ 2
.
Thus
E[µ¯x2 | F
µ
t ] =
{
E[γ] = 0 if t ≤ 1
E[γ | γ] = γ if 1 < t ≤ 2
.
Since µ¯x2 = γ = sign(γ), we conclude that α
∗
t = sign(E[µ¯
x
2 | F
µ
t ]). It is then readly checked using
the previous arguments that (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,2], P,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution. 
To be absolutely clear, the above two propositions imply the following: If S := {ν ∈ P(X ) :
ν¯x2 ∈ {−2, 0, 2}}, then every strong MFG solution lies in S, but there exists a weak MFG solution
with P (µ ∈ S) = 0.
Remark 3.8. The example of Proposition 3.7 can be modified to illustrate another strange phe-
nomenon. The proof of Proposition 3.7 has α∗t = γ for t ∈ (1, 2] and α
∗
t = 0 for t ≤ 1. Instead,
we could set α∗t = ηt for t ≤ 1, for any mean-zero [−1, 1]-valued process (ηt)t∈[0,1] independent
of γ and W . The rest of the proof proceeds unchanged, yielding another weak MFG solution
with the same Cd-marginal µx. The difference is in the control as well as the joint distribution
µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | γ). (In fact, we could even choose α∗ to be any mean-zero relaxed control
on the time interval [0, 1].) Intuitively, for t ≤ 1 we have E[µ¯x2 | F
µ
t ] = 0, and the choice of control
on the time interval [0, 1] does not matter in light of (3.3); the agent then has some freedom to
randomize her choice of control among the family of non-unique optimal choices. This type of ran-
domization can typically occur when optimal controls are non-unique, and although it is unnatural
in some sense, our main results indicate that this behavior can indeed arise in the limit from the
finite-player games.
3.4. Supports of weak solutions. In this section, we attempt to partially explain what permits
the existence of weak solutions which are not randomizations among strong solutions. As was
mentioned in Remark 3.5, the culprit is the adaptedness required of controls. Indeed, in the example
of Section 3.3, very different optimal controls arise depending on whether or not the measure µ is
random. If µ is deterministic, then so is the optimal control, and we may write this optimal control
as a functional of µ by
αˆD(t, µ) = sign(µ¯xT ), t ∈ [0, T ].
The problem is as follows: for each fixed deterministic µ, the optimal control (αˆD(t, µ))t∈[0,T ] is
deterministic and thus trivially adapted, but when µ is allowed to be random then this control is no
longer adapted and thus no longer admissible. If, for a different MFG problem, it happens that αˆD
is in fact progressively measurable with respect to (Fµt )t∈[0,T ], then this control is still admissible
when µ is randomized; moreover, it should be optimal when µ is randomized, since it was optimal
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for each realization of µ. The following results make this idea precise, but first some terminology
will be useful. As usual we work under assumption A at all times, and the initial state distribution
λ ∈ Pp
′
(Rd) is fixed.
Definition 3.9. We say that a function αˆ : [0, T ]×Cm×Cd×Pp(X )→ A is a universally admissible
control if:
(1) αˆ is progressively measurable with respect to the (universal completion of the) natural
filtration (FW,X,µt )t∈[0,T ] on C
m×Cd×Pp(X ). Here FW,X,µt := σ(Ws, Xs, µ(C) : s ≤ t, C ∈
FXt ) for each t, where (W,X, µ) denotes the identity map on C
m × Cd × Pp(X ).
(2) For each fixed ν ∈ Pp(X ), the SDE
dXt = b(t,Xt, ν
x
t , αˆ(t,W,X, ν))dt+ σ(t,Xt, ν
x
t )dWt, X0 ∼ λ, (3.4)
is unique in joint law; that is, if we are given two pairs of processes (W it , X
i
t)t∈[0,T ] for
i = 1, 2, possibly on different filtered probability spaces but with (W it )t∈[0,T ] a Wiener
process in either case, then (W 1, X1) and (W 2, X2) have the same law.
(3) Suppose we are given a filtered probability space (Ω˜, (F˜t)t∈[0,T ], P˜ ) supporting an (F˜t)t∈[0,T ]-
Wiener process W˜ , an F˜0-measurable Rd-valued random variable ξ˜ with law λ, and a Pp(X )-
valued random variable µ˜ independent of (ξ,W ) such that µ˜(C) is F˜t-measurable for each
C ∈ FXt and t ∈ [0, T ]. Then there exists a strong solution X˜ of the SDE
dX˜t = b(t, X˜t, µ˜
x
t , αˆ(t,W, X˜, µ˜))dt + σ(t, X˜t, µ˜
x
t )dW˜t, X˜0 = ξ˜,
and it satisfies E
∫ T
0
|αˆ(t,W, X˜, µ˜)|pdt <∞.
If αˆ is a universally admissible control, we say it is locally optimal if for each fixed ν ∈ Pp(X ) there
exists a complete filtered probability space (Ω(ν), (F
(ν)
t )t∈[0,T ], P
ν) supporting a Wiener processW ν
and a continuous adapted process Xν such that (W ν , Xν) satisfies the SDE (3.4) and:
(4) If (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) supports am-dimensional Wiener processW , a progressiveP(A)-valued
process Λ, and a continuous adapted Rd-valued process X satisfying
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, ν
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ν
x
t )dWt, P ◦X
−1
0 = λ,
then
E
P (ν)
[
Γ
(
νx, dtδαˆ(t,Wν ,Xν ,ν)(da), X
ν
)]
≥ EP [Γ(νx,Λ, X)] .
We need an additional assumption C, which simply requires the uniqueness of the optimal
controls. Some simple conditions are given in [11, Proposition 4.4] under which assumption C
holds: in particular, it suffices to assume that b and σ are affine in (x, a), that f is strictly concave
in (x, a), and that g is concave in x.
Assumption C. If (Ω˜i, (F it )t∈[0,T ], P
i,W i, µi,Λi, X i) for i = 1, 2 both satisfy (1-5) of Definition
3.1 as well as P 1 ◦ (µ1)−1 = P 2 ◦ (µ2)−1, then P 1 ◦ (W 1, µ1,Λ1, X1)−1 = P 2 ◦ (W 2, µ2,Λ2, X2)−1.
Theorem 3.10. Assume C holds. Suppose that there exists a universally admissible and lo-
cally optimal control αˆ : [0, T ] × Cm × Cd × Pp(X ) → A. Then, for every weak MFG solution
(Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) (without common noise), P ◦ µ
−1 is concentrated on the set of strong
MFG solutions (without common noise). Conversely, if ρ ∈ Pp(Pp(X )) is concentrated on the set
of strong MFG solutions (without common noise), then there exists a weak MFG solution (without
common noise) with P ◦ µ−1 = ρ.
Proof. Let (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) be a weak MFG solution (without common noise).
Step 1: We will first show that necessarily Λt = δαˆ(t,W,X,µ) holds dt⊗ dP -a.e. On (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P )
we may use (3) of Definition 3.9 to find a strong solution X ′ of the SDE
dX ′t = b(t,X
′
t, µ
x
t , αˆ(t,W,X
′, µ))dt+ σ(t,X ′t, µ
x
t )dWt, X
′
0 = X0,
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wth EP
∫ T
0
|αˆ(t,W,X ′, µ)|pdt <∞. In particular, X ′ is adapted to the (completion of the) filtration
FX0,W,µt := σ(X0,Ws, µ(C) : s ≤ t, C ∈ F
X
t ). Let Λ
′ := dtδαˆ(t,W,X′,µ)(da). Then it is clear
that (Ω˜, (FX0,W,µt )t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ
′, X ′) satisfies conditions (1-4) of Definition 3.1. Optimality of
P implies
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)] .
On the other hand, for P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν ∈ Pp(X ), the following hold under P (· | µ = ν):
• W is a (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process.
• (W,Λ, X) satisfies
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, ν
x
t , a)Λt(da) + σ(t,Xt, ν
x
t )dWt.
• (W,X ′) solves the SDE (3.4).
From the local optimality of αˆ we conclude (keeping in mind the uniqueness condition (2) of Defi-
nition 3.9) that
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)|µ] ≤ EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)|µ] .
Thus
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] = EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)] .
By assumption C, there is only one optimal control, and so Λ = Λ′ = dtδαˆ(t,W,X′,µ)(da), P -a.s.
From uniqueness of the SDE solutions we conclude that X = X ′ a.s. as well, completing the first
step. (Note we do not use the assumptions of Definition 3.9 for this last conclusion, but only the
Lipschitz assumption (A.4).)
Step 2: Next, we show that P ◦ µ−1 is concentrated on the set of strong MFG solutions. Using (2)
and (3) of Definition 3.9, we know that for P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν ∈ Pp(X ) there exists on some filtered
probability space (Ω(ν), (F
(ν)
t )t∈[0,T ], P
ν) a weak solution Xν of the SDE
dXνt = b(t,X
ν
t , ν
x
t , αˆ(t,W
ν , Xν , ν))dt+ σ(t,Xνt , ν
x
t )dW
ν
t , P
ν ◦ (Xν0 )
−1 = λ,
where W ν is an (F
(ν)
t )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process. From Step 1, on (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) we have
dXt = b(t,Xt, µ
x
t , αˆ(t,W,X, µ))dt+ σ(t,Xt, µ
x
t )dWt, P ◦X
−1
0 = λ.
It follows from the P -independence of µ, X0, and W along with the uniqueness in law of condition
(2) of Definition 3.9 that
P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ = ν) = P ν ◦
(
W ν , dtδαˆ(t,Wν ,Xν ,ν)(da), X
ν
)−1
, (3.5)
for P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν ∈ Pp(X ). Since µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ), it follows that
ν = P ν ◦
(
W ν , dtδαˆ(t,Wν ,Xν ,ν)(da), X
ν
)−1
, for P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν ∈ Pp(X ). (3.6)
We conclude that P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν ∈ Pp(X ) is a strong MFG solution, or more precisely that
(Ω(ν), (F
(ν)
t )t∈[0,T ], P
ν ,W ν , ν, dtδαˆ(t,Wν ,Xν ,ν)(da), X
ν)
is a strong MFG solution. Indeed, we just verified condition (6) of Definition 3.1, and conditions
(1-4) are obvious. The optimality condition (5) of Definition 3.1 is a simple consequence of the local
optimality of αˆ
Step 3: We turn now to the converse. Let (Ω˜,F , P ) be any probability space supporting a random
variable (ξ,W, µ) with values in Rd × Cm × Pp(X ) with law λ × Wm × ρ, where Wm is Wiener
measure on Cm. Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] denote the P -completion of (σ(ξ,Ws, µ(C) : s ≤ t, C ∈ F
X
t ))t∈[0,T ].
Solve strongly on (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) the SDE
dXt = b(t,Xt, µ
x
t , αˆ(t,W,X, µ))dt+ σ(t,Xt, µ
x
t )dWt, X0 = ξ.
Note that hypothesis (3) makes this possible. Define Λ := dtδαˆ(t,W,X,µ)(da). Clearly P ◦ µ
−1 = ρ
by construction, and we claim that (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution. Using
hypothesis (1), it is clear that conditions (1-4) of Definition 3.1 hold, and thus we must only check
the optimality condition (5) and the fixed point condition (6).
THE MEAN FIELD LIMIT FOR STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 17
First, let (Ω˜′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′,W ′, µ′,Λ′, X ′) be an alternative probability space satisfying (1-4)
of Definition 3.1 and P ′ ◦ (µ′)−1 = P ◦ µ−1 = ρ. The uniqueness in law condition (2) of Definition
3.9 implies that P (((W,X) ∈ · | µ = ν) is exactly the law of the solution of the SDE (3.4), for
P ◦ µ−1-a.e. ν. Applying local optimality of αˆ for each ν, we conclude that
E
P [Γ(νx,Λ, X)|µ = ν] ≥ EP
′
[Γ(νx,Λ′, X ′)|µ = ν] , for ρ− a.e. ν.
Integrate with respect to ρ on both sides to get EP [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP
′
[Γ((µ′)x,Λ′, X ′)], which
verifies condition (5) of Definition 3.1. Finally, we check (6) by applying Step 1 to deterministic µ
and again using uniqueness of the SDE (3.4) to find that both (3.5) and (3.6) hold for ρ-a.e. ν. 
3.5. Applications of Theorem 3.10. It is admittedly quite difficult to check that there exists a
universally admissible, locally optimal control, and we will leave this problem open in all but the
simplest cases. Note, however, that conditions (2) and (3) of Definition 3.9 hold automatically when
αˆ(t, w, x, ν) = αˆ′(t, w, x0, ν), for some αˆ
′ : [0, T ]× Cm × Rd × Pp(X )→ A.
A simple class of examples. Suppose A ⊂ Rk is convex, g ≡ 0, and f = f(t, µ, a) is twice differen-
tiable in a with uniformly negative Hessian in a. That is, D2af(t, µ, a) ≤ −δ for all (t, µ), for some
δ > 0. Suppose as usual that assumption A holds. Define
αˆ(t, w, x, ν) := argmin
a∈A
f(t, νxt , a), for (t, w, x, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× C
m × Cd × Pp(X ).
It is straightforward to check that assumption C holds and that αˆ is a universally admissible and
locally optimal control. Of course, this example is simple in that the state process does not influence
the optimization.
A possible general strategy. The following approach may be more widely applicable. First, for a
fixed ν ∈ Pp(X ), we may define the value function V [ν](t, x) of the corresponding optimal control
problem in the usual way, and it should solve a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE of the form{
−∂tV [ν](t, x) −H(t, x, νxt , DxV [ν](t, x), D
2
xV [ν](t, x)) = 0, on [0, T )× R
d,
V [ν](T, x) = g(x, νxT )
,
where the Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]× Rd × Pp(Rd)× Rd × Rd×d → R is defined by
H(t, x, µ, y, z) := sup
a∈A
[
y⊤b(t, x, µ, a) + f(t, x, µ, a)
]
+
1
2
Tr
[
zσσ⊤(t, x, µ)
]
.
Suppose that we can show (as is well known to be possible in very general situations) that for each
ν the value function V [ν] is the unique (viscosity) solution of this HJB equation. Then, an optimal
control can be obtained by finding αˆ(t, xt, ν) which achieves the supremum in
H(t, xt, ν
x
t , DxV [ν](t, xt), D
2
xV [ν](t, xt)),
for each (t, x, ν). The crux of this approach is to show that the value function V [ν](t, x) is adapted
with respect to ν in some sense, which would imply that αˆ is universally admissible and locally
optimal. A nice special case would be a Markovian dependence, V [ν](t, x) = V˜ (t, x, νxt ). In short,
we must study the dependence of a family of HJB equations on a path-valued parameter.
4. Mean field games on a canonical space
In this section, we begin to work toward the proofs of the main results announced in Sections 2.4
and 2.5. This section briefly elaborates on the notion of mean field game solution on the canonical
space, in order to state simpler conditions by which may check that a measure P ∈ P(Ω) is a weak
MFG solution, in the sense of Definition 2.2. The definitions and notations of this section are again
mostly borrowed from [11], to which the reader is referred for more details.
First, we mention some notational conventions. We will routinely use the same letter φ to
denote the natural extension of a function φ : E → F to any product space E × E′, given by
φ(x, y) := φ(x) for (x, y) ∈ E × E′. Similarly, we will use the same symbol (Ft)t∈[0,T ] to denote
the natural extension of a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] on a space E to any product space E ×E
′, given by
(Ft ⊗ {∅, E
′})t∈[0,T ].
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We will make use of the following canonical spaces, two of which have been defined already but
are recalled for convenience:
X := Cm × V × Cd, Ω0 := R
d × Cm0 × Cm, Ω := Ω0 × P
p(X )× V × Cd.
From now on, let ξ, B, W , µ, Λ, and X denote the identity maps on Rd, Cm0 , Cm, Pp(X ), V , and
Cd, respectively. Note, for example, that our convention permitsW to denote both the identity map
on Cm and the projection from Ω to Cm. The canonical filtration (FΛt )t∈[0,T ] is defined on V by
FΛt := σ (Λ([0, s]× C) : s ≤ t, C ∈ B(A)) .
It is known (e.g. [29, Lemma 3.8]) that there exists a (FΛt )t∈[0,T ]-predictable process Λ : [0, T ]×V →
P(A) such that dt[Λ(t, q)](da) = q for each q, or equivalently Λ(t, q) = qt for a.e. t, for each q. Then,
we may think of (Λ(t, ·))t∈[0,T ] as the canonical P(A)-valued process defined on V , and it is clear
that FΛt = σ(Λ(s, ·) : s ≤ t). With this in mind, we may somewhat abusively write Λt in place of
Λ(t, ·), and with this notation FΛt = σ(Λs : s ≤ t).
The canonical processes B, W , and X generate obvious natural filtrations, denoted (FBt )t∈[0,T ],
(FWt )t∈[0,T ], and (F
X
t )t∈[0,T ], respectively. We will frequently work with filtrations generated by
several canonical processes, such as Fξ,B,Wt := σ(ξ, Bs,Ws : s ≤ t) defined on Ω0, and F
ξ,B,W,Λ
t =
Fξ,B,Wt ⊗ F
Λ
t defined on Ω0 × V . Our convention on canonical extensions of filtrations to product
spaces permits the use of (Fξ,B,Wt )t∈[0,T ] to refer also to the filtration on Ω0 × V generated by
(ξ, B,W ), and it should be clear from context on which space the filtration is defined. Hence, the
filtration (FXt )t∈[0,T ] defined just before Definition 2.1 could alternatively be denoted F
X
t = F
W,Λ,X
t ,
but we stick with the former notation for consistency. Define the canonical filtration (Fµt )t∈[0,T ] on
Pp(X ) by
Fµt := σ
(
µ(C) : C ∈ FXt
)
.
There is somewhat of a conflict in notation, between our use of (ξ, B,W ) here as the identity
map on Rd × Cm0 × Cm and our previous use (beginning in Section 2.3) of the same letters for
random variables with values in (Rd)n × Cm0 × (Cm)n, defined on an n-player environment En =
(Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ). However, we will almost exclusively discuss the random variables
(ξ, B,W ) through the lenses of various probability measures, and thus it should be clear from
context (i.e. from the nearest notated probability measure) which random variables (ξ, B,W ) we
are working with at any given moment. For example, given P ∈ P(Ω), the notation P ◦ (ξ, B,W )−1
refers to a measure on Rd×Cm0×Cm. On the other hand, Pn is reserved for the measure on Ωn in a
typical n-player environment, and so Pn ◦ (ξ, B,W )
−1 refers to a measure on (Rd)n ×Cm0 × (Cm)n.
Recall that the initial state distribution λ ∈ Pp
′
(Rd) is fixed throughout. Let Mλ denote the
set of ρ ∈ Pp(Ω0 × Pp(X )) satisfying
(1) ρ ◦ ξ−1 = λ,
(2) B and W are independent Wiener processes on (Ω0 × Pp(X ), (F
ξ,B,W,µ
t )t∈[0,T ], ρ).
(Note that the set Mλ was denoted Ppc [(Ω0,Wλ) P
p(X )] in [11]; we prefer this shorter notation
mainly because we will make no use of it after this section.) For ρ ∈Mλ, the class A(ρ) of admissible
controls is the set of probability measures Q on Ω0 × Pp(X ) × V satisfying:
(1) FΛt and F
ξ,B,W,µ
T are conditionally independent under Q given F
ξ,B,W,µ
t , for each t ∈ [0, T ],
(2) Q ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1 = ρ,
(3) EQ
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt <∞.
We say Q ∈ A(ρ) is a strict control if there exists an A-valued process (αt)t∈[0,T ], progressively
measurable with respect to the Q-completion of (Fξ,B,W,µ,Λt )t∈[0,T ], such that
Q (Λ = dtδαt(da)) = Q(Λt = δαt a.e. t) = 1.
We say Q ∈ A(ρ) is a strong control if the above holds but with (αt)t∈[0,T ] progressively measurable
with respect to the Q-completion of (Fξ,B,W,µt )t∈[0,T ].
If ρ ∈ Mλ and Q ∈ A(ρ), note that B and W are Wiener processes on (Ω0 × Pp(X ) ×
V , (Fξ,B,W,µ,Λt )t∈[0,T ], Q). For each ρ ∈ Mλ and Q ∈ A(ρ), on the completion of the filtered
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probability space (Ω0 × Pp(X ) × V , (F
ξ,B,W,µ,Λ
t )t∈[0,T ], Q), there exists a unique strong solution Y
of the SDE
Yt = ξ +
∫ t
0
∫
A
b(s, Ys, µ
x
s , a)Λs(da)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s, Ys, µ
x
s )dWs +
∫ t
0
σ0(s, Ys, µ
x
s )dBs. (4.1)
Viewing Y as a random element of Cd, let R(Q) := Q ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ,Λ, Y )−1 ∈ P(Ω) denote the joint
law of the solution and the inputs. Define
RA(ρ) := R(A(ρ)) = {R(Q) : Q ∈ A(ρ)} ,
which we think of as the set of admissible joint laws for the optimal control problem associated to ρ.
Alternatively,R(Q) may be defined as the unique element P of P(Ω) such that P ◦(ξ, B,W, µ,Λ)−1 =
Q and such that the canonical processes (ξ, B,W, µ,Λ, X) verify the state SDE on Ω:
Xt = ξ +
∫ t
0
∫
A
b(s,Xs, µ
x
s , a)Λs(da)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs, µ
x
s )dWs +
∫ t
0
σ0(s,Xs, µ
x
s )dBs. (4.2)
It follows from standard estimates (e.g. [11, Lemma 2.4]) that R(Q) ∈ Pp(Ω).
Recalling the definition of the objective functional Γ from (2.4), we define the reward associated
to an element P ∈ Pp(Ω) by
J(P ) := EP [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] .
Define the set of optimal controls corresponding to ρ by
A∗(ρ) := arg max
Q∈A(ρ)
J(R(Q)),
and note that
RA∗(ρ) := R(A∗(ρ)) = arg max
P∈RA(ρ)
J(P ).
Let us now adapt the definition of MFG solution to the canonical space Ω:
Definition 4.1 (MFG pre-solution). We say P ∈ P(Ω) is a MFG pre-solution if it satisfies the
following:
(1) ξ, W , and (B, µ) are independent under P .
(2) P ∈ RA(ρ) where ρ := P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1 is in Mλ.
(3) µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | B, µ) a.s. That is, µ is a version of the conditional law of (W,Λ, X)
given (B, µ).
The following two Lemmas give us a characterization of MFG solution which is convenient for
taking limits. The first is more or less obvious, stated as a Lemma merely for emphasis, while the
second has more content and is discussed thoroughly in [11].
Lemma 4.2 (Lemma 3.9 of [11]). Let P ∈ Pp(Ω), and define ρ := P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1. If P is an
MFG pre-solution and P ∈ RA∗(ρ), then P is a weak MFG solution in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Lemma 4.3 (Lemma 3.7 of [11]). Let P ∈ Pp(Ω), and define ρ := P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1. Suppose the
following hold under P :
(1) B and W are independent (Fξ,B,W,µ,Λ,Xt )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener processes, and P ◦ ξ
−1 = λ.
(2) ξ, W , and (B, µ) are independent.
(3) µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | B, µ), a.s.
(4) The canonical processes (ξ, B,W, µ,Λ, X) verify the state equation (4.2) on Ω.
Then P is a MFG pre-solution.
We close the section with three useful results from [11], topological in nature. They will not be
used until the final step of the proof of Theorem 2.6, in Section 5.4.
Lemma 4.4 (Lemma 3.12 of [11]). The map R :
⋃
ρ∈Mλ
A(ρ)→ Pp(Ω) is continuous.
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Lemma 4.5. The map J : Pp(Ω) → R is upper semicontinuous, and for each ρ ∈ Mλ the sets
A∗(ρ) and RA∗(ρ) are nonempty and compact. Moreover, the restriction of J to a set K ⊂ Pp(Ω)
is continuous whenever K satisfies the uniform integrability condition
lim
r→∞
sup
P∈K
E
P
[∫ T
0
∫
{|a|>r}
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt
]
= 0. (4.3)
Proof. This is all covered by Lemma 3.13 of [11], except for the final claim. Now let Pn → P∞
in Pp(Ω) with Pn ∈ K for each n. The continuity and growth assumptions on g imply that
E
Pn [g(XT , µ
x
T )] → E
P [g(XT , µ
x
T )], and the f term causes the only problems. The convergence
Pn → P∞ implies (e.g. by [35, Theorem 7.12])
lim
r→∞
sup
n
E
Pn
[
‖X‖pT1{‖X‖pT>r} +
∫
Cd
‖z‖pTµ
x(dz)1{
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
T
µx(dz)>r}
]
= 0. (4.4)
For 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞, define probability measures Qn on Ω˜ := [0, T ]× Rd × Pp(Rd)×A by
Qn(C) :=
1
T
E
Pn
[∫ T
0
∫
A
1{(t,Xt,µxt ,a)∈C}Λt(da)dt
]
, C ∈ B(Ω˜).
Certainly Qn → Q∞ weakly in P(Ω˜). Since the [0, T ]-marginal is the same for each Qn, it is known
(e.g. [22] or [29, Lemma A.3]) that this implies
∫
φdQn →
∫
φdQ∞ for each bounded measurable
φ : Ω˜ → R with φ(t, ·) continuous for each t. Thus Qn ◦ f−1 → Q∞ ◦ f−1 weakly in P(R), by
continuity of f(t, ·) for each t. But it follows from (4.3), (4.4), and the growth assumption of (A.5)
that
lim
r→∞
sup
n
∫
{|f |>r}
f dQn = 0,
and thus
∫
f dQn →
∫
f dQ∞. 
The following definition highlights a useful subclass of admissible controls, which Lemma 4.7
shows is dense in the class of admissible controls in a sense.
Definition 4.6. A function φ : Ω0 × Pp(X ) → V is said to be adapted if φ−1(C) ∈ F
ξ,B,W,µ
t for
each C ∈ FΛt and t ∈ [0, T ]. We say φ is compact if there exists a compact set K ⊂ [0, T ] × A
such that φ(ω, ν)(Kc) = 0 for each (ω, ν) ∈ Ω0 × Pp(X ). For ρ ∈ Mλ, let Aa(ρ) denote the set of
measures of the form
ρ ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ, φ(ξ, B,W, µ))−1
where φ is adapted and compact and Pp(X ) ∋ ν 7→ φ(ω, ν) is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω0.
Lemma 4.7. For each ρ ∈ Mλ, Aa(ρ) is a dense subset of A(ρ). Moreover, for each P ∈ RA(ρ)
with EP
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt < ∞, there exist Pn ∈ RAa(ρ) such that K := {Pn : n ≥ 1} satisfies
(4.3) and Pn → P in Pp(Ω); in particular, J(Pn)→ J(P ).
Proof. Lemma 3.11 of [11] covers the first claim in the case that A is bounded, while the general
case is treated in the second step of the proof of Lemma 3.17 in [11]. Except for the claim that K
satisfies the uniform integrability condition (4.3), the second statement is precisely Lemma 3.17 of
[11], the proof of which elucidates this uniform integrability. 
5. Proof of Theorem 2.6
With the mean field game concisely summarized on the canonical space, we now turn to the
proof of Theorem 2.6. Throughout the section, we work with the notation and assumptions of
Theorem 2.6. Following Lemma 4.2, the strategy is to prove the claimed relative compactness, then
that any limit is a MFG pre-solution using Lemma 4.3, and then finally that any limit corresponds
to an optimal control. First, we establish some useful estimates for the n-player systems.
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5.1. Estimates. The first estimate below, Lemma 5.1, is fairly standard, but it is important that it
is independent of the number of agents n. The second estimate, Lemma 5.2, will be used to establish
some uniform integrability of the equilibrium controls, and it is precisely where we need the coercivity
of the running cost f . Note in the following proofs that the initial states X i0[Λ] = X
i
0 = ξ
i and the
initial empirical measure µ̂x0 [Λ] = µ̂
x
0 =
1
n
∑n
i=1 δξi do not depend on the choice of control. Recall
the definition of the truncated supremum norm (2.2).
Lemma 5.1. There exists a constant c5 ≥ 1, depending only on p, p′, T , and the constant c1 of
assumption (A.4) such that, for each γ ∈ [p, p′], β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann(En), and 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
E
Pn [‖Xk[β]‖γT ] ≤ c5E
Pn
[
1 + |ξ1|γ +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|γβkt (da)dt +
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|γβit(da)dt
]
,
and
E
Pn
∫
Cd
‖z‖γT µ̂
x[β](dz) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pn [‖X i[β]‖γT ] ≤ c5E
Pn
[
1 + |ξ1|γ +
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|γβit(da)dt
]
.
Proof. We omit [β] from the notation throughout the proof, as well as the superscript Pn which
should appear above the expectations. Abbreviate Σ := σσ⊤+σ0σ
⊤
0 . Apply the Burkholder-Davis-
Gundy inequality and assumption (A.4) to find a universal constant C > 0 (which will change from
line to line) such that, for all γ ∈ [p, p′],
E[‖Xk‖γt ] ≤CE
[
|ξk|γ +
(∫ t
0
∫
A
|b(s,Xks , µ̂
x
s , a)|β
k
s (da)ds
)γ
+
(∫ t
0
∣∣Σ(s,Xks , µ̂xs )∣∣ ds)γ/2
]
≤C E
{
1 + |ξk|γ +
∫ t
0
[
‖Xk‖γs +
(∫
Cd
‖z‖psµ̂
x(dz)
)γ/p
+
∫
A
|a|γβks (da)
]
ds
}
+ C E

[∫ t
0
(
‖Xk‖pσs +
(∫
Cd
‖z‖psµ̂
x(dz)
)pσ/p)
ds
]γ/2
≤C E
{
1 + |ξk|γ +
∫ t
0
[
‖Xk‖γs +
∫
Cd
‖z‖γs µ̂
x(dz) +
∫
A
|a|γβks (da)
]
ds
}
.
The last line follows from the bound (
∫
‖z‖psν(dz))
γ/p ≤
∫
‖z‖γsν(dz) for ν ∈ P(C
d), which holds
because γ ≥ p. To deal with the γ/2 outside of the time integral, we used the following argument.
If γ ≥ 2, we simply use Jensen’s inequality to pass γ/2 inside of the time integral, and then use the
inequality |x|pσγ/2 ≤ 1 + |x|γ , which holds because pσ ≤ 2. The other case is 1 ∨ pσ ≤ p ≤ γ < 2,
and we use then the inequalities |x|γ/2 ≤ 1 + |x| and |x|pσ ≤ 1 + |x|γ . By Gronwall’s inequality,
E[‖Xk‖γt ] ≤ CE
{
1 + |ξk|γ +
∫ t
0
[∫
Cd
‖z‖γs µ̂
x(dz) +
∫
A
|a|γβks (da)
]
ds
}
(5.1)
Note that EPn [|ξk|γ ] = EPn [|ξ1|γ ] for each k, and average over k = 1, . . . , n to get
E
∫
Cd
‖z‖γt µ̂
x(dz) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[‖X i‖γt ]
≤ CE
{
1 + |ξ1|γ +
∫ t
0
[∫
Cd
‖z‖γs µ̂
x(dz) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫
A
|a|γβis(da)
]
ds
}
.
Apply Gronwall’s inequality once again to prove the second claimed inequality. The first claim
follows from the second and from (5.1). 
Lemma 5.2. There exist constants c6, c7 > 0, depending only p, p
′, T , and the constants c1, c2, c3
of assumption A, such that for each β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann(En), the following hold:
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(1) For each 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)βkt (da)dt ≤ c7E
Pn
1 + |ξ1|p + 1
n
n∑
i6=k
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)
− c7Jk(β).
(2) If for some n ≥ k ≥ 1, ǫ > 0, and β˜k ∈ An(En) we have
Jk(β˜
k) ≥ sup
β˜∈An(En)
Jk((β
−k, β˜)) − ǫ,
then
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)β˜kt (da)dt ≤ c7E
Pn
1 + ǫ+ |ξ1|p + 1
n
n∑
i6=k
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)
 .
(3) If β is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for some ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) ∈ [0,∞)n, then
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)βit(da)dt ≤ c7
(
1 + EPn |ξ1|p +
1
n
n∑
i=1
ǫi
)
.
Proof. Recall that EPn [|ξ1|p] <∞ and that every β˜ ∈ An(En) is required to satisfy
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβ˜t(da)dt <∞.
Moreover, if EPn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
β˜t(da)dt = ∞ then the upper bound of assumption (A.5) implies that
Jk((β
−k, β˜)) = −∞, for each β ∈ Ann(En) and 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Proof of (1): First, use the upper bounds of f and g from assumption (A.5) to get
Jk(β) ≤ c2(T + 1)E
Pn
[
1 +
∥∥Xk[β]∥∥p
T
+
∫
Cd
‖z‖pT µ̂
x[β](dz)
]
− c3E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βkt (da)dt
≤ 3c5c2(T + 1)E
Pn
[
1 + |ξ1|p +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβkt (da)dt+
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)dt
]
− c3E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βkt (da)dt,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5.1 (and c5 ≥ 1). This proves the first claim, with
c6 := 6c5c2(T + 1)/c3 and c7 := c6 ∨ (1/c3).
Proof of (2): Fix a0 ∈ A arbitrarily. Abuse notation somewhat by writing a0 in place of the
constant strict control (δa0)t∈[0,T ] ∈ An(En). Lemma 5.1 implies
E
Pn
[∥∥Xk[(β−k, a0)]∥∥pT ] ≤ c5EPn
1 + |ξ1|p + T (1 + 1
n
)
|a0|
p +
1
n
n∑
i6=k
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)dt

and
E
Pn
∫
Cd
‖z‖pT µ̂
x[(β−k, a0)](dz) ≤ c5E
Pn
1 + |ξ1|p + T
n
|a0|
p +
1
n
n∑
i6=k
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)dt
 .
Use the hypothesis along with the lower bounds on f and g from assumption (A.5) to get
Jk((β
−k, β˜k)) ≥ Jk((β
−k, a0))− ǫ
≥ −c2(T + 1)E
Pn
[
1 +
∥∥Xk[(β−k, a0)]∥∥pT + ∫
Cd
‖z‖pT µ̂
x[(β−k, a0)](dz) + |a0|
p′
]
− ǫ
≥ −CEPn
1 + |ξ1|p + 1
n
n∑
i6=k
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)dt
 − ǫ,
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where C > 0 depends only on c2, c5, T , and |a0|p
′
. Applying this with the first result with β
replaced by (β−k, β˜k) proves (2), replacing c7 by c7(1 + C).
Proof of (3): If β is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, then applying (2) with β˜k = βk gives
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)βkt (da)dt ≤ c7E
Pn
[
1 + ǫk + |ξ
1|p +
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pβit(da)
]
.
The proof is completed by averaging over k = 1, . . . , n, rearranging terms, and replacing c6 by
c6 + c7. 
5.2. Relative compactness and MFG pre-solution. This section proves that (Pn)
∞
n=1, defined
in (2.8), is relatively compact and that each limit point is a MFG pre-solution. First, we state a
tailor-made tightness result for Itoˆ processes. It is essentially an application of Aldous’ criterion,
but the proof is deferred to Section B.
Proposition 5.3. Fix c > 0 and a positive integer k. For each κ ≥ 0, let Qκ ⊂ P(V×Cd) denote the
set of laws P ◦(Λ, X)−1 of V×Cd-valued random variables (Λ, X) defined on some filtered probability
space (Θ, (Gt)t∈[0,T ], P ) satisfying
dXt =
∫
A
B(t, a)Λt(da)dt +Σ(t)dWt,
where the following hold:
(1) W is a (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process of dimension k.
(2) Σ : [0, T ]× Θ → Rd×k is progressively measurable, and B : [0, T ]× Θ × A → Rd is jointly
measurable with respect to the progressive σ-field on [0, T ]×Θ and the Borel σ-field on A.
(3) X0 is G0-measurable.
(4) There exists a nonnegative GT -measurable random variable Z such that
(a) For each (t, ω, a) ∈ [0, T ]×Θ×A,
|B(t, a)| ≤ c (1 + |Xt|+ Z + |a|) , |ΣΣ
⊤(t)| ≤ c (1 + |Xt|
pσ + Zpσ )
(b) Lastly,
E
P
[
|X0|
p′ + Zp
′
+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt
]
≤ κ.
(That is, we vary over Σ, B, Z, k, and the probability space.) Then, for any triangular array
{κn,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊂ [0,∞) with supn
1
n
∑n
i=1 κn,i <∞, the set
Q :=
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pi : n ≥ 1, P
i ∈ Qκn,i for i = 1, . . . , n
}
is relatively compact in Pp(V × Cd).
Lemma 5.4. (Pn)
∞
n=1 is relatively compact in P
p(Ω), and
sup
n
E
Pn
[
‖X‖p
′
T +
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ(dz) +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt
]
<∞. (5.2)
Proof. We first establish (5.2). Since Λn is a ǫn-Nash equilibrium, part (3) of Lemma 5.2 implies
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)Λn,kt (da)dt ≤ c7
(
1 + EPn [|ξ1|p] +
1
n
n∑
k=1
ǫnk
)
.
The right-hand side above is bounded in n, because of hypothesis (2.7) and because Pn ◦ (ξ1)−1 =
λ ∈ Pp(Rd) for each n. Since p′ > p, it follows that
sup
n
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,kt (da)dt <∞. (5.3)
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Lemma 5.1 implies
E
Pn
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ̂
x[Λn](dz) ≤ c5E
Pn
[
1 + |ξ1|p
′
+
1
n
n∑
k=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,kt (da)dt
]
=: κn.
Thus
E
Pn
[
‖X‖p
′
T +
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ(dz) +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt
]
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
[
‖Xk[Λn]‖p
′
T +
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ̂
x[Λn](dz) +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,kt (da)dt
]
≤ c5E
Pn
[
2 + 2|ξ1|p
′
+
3
n
n∑
k=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,kt (da)dt
]
≤ 3κn.
Recall in the last line that c5 ≥ 1. From (5.3) we conclude that supn κn <∞, and (5.2) follows.
To prove that (Pn)
∞
n=1, it suffices to show that each family of marginals is relatively compact
(e.g. by [29, Lemma A.2]). Since (Pn ◦ (ξ, B,W )−1)∞n=1 is a singleton, it is trivially compact. We
may apply Proposition 5.3 to show that
Pn ◦ (Λ, X)
−1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦ (Λ
n,i, Xn,i[Λn])−1
forms a relatively compact sequence. Indeed, in the notation of Proposition 5.3, we use Z =
(
∫
Cd
‖z‖pT µ̂
x[Λn](dz))1/p and c = c1 of assumption (A.4) to check that Pn ◦ (Λn,i, Xn,i[Λn])−1 is in
Qκn,i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
κn,i = κn + E
Pn
[
|ξi|p
′
+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,it (da)dt
]
.
Since c5 ≥ 1, we have
1
n
∑n
i=1 κn,i ≤ 2κn, and so supn
1
n
∑n
i=1 κn,i < ∞. Thus, Proposition 5.3
establishes the relative compactness of (Pn ◦ (Λ, X)
−1)∞n=1. Next, note that Pn ◦ (W,Λ, X)
−1 is the
mean measure of Pn ◦ µ−1 for each n, since for each bounded measurable φ : X → R we have
E
Pn [φ(W,Λ, X)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pn
[
φ(W i,Λn,i, X i[Λn])
]
= EPn
∫
X
φdµ̂[Λn] = EPn
∫
X
φdµ.
Since also
sup
n
E
Pn
[
‖W‖p
′
T +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt+ ‖X‖
p′
T
]
<∞,
the relative compactness of (Pn ◦ µ−1)∞n=1 in P
p(Pp(X )) follows from the relative compactness
of (Pn ◦ (W,Λ, X)−1)∞n=1 in P
p(X ). Indeed, when p = 0 and P0 is given the topology of weak
convergence, this is a well known result of Sznitman, stated in (2.5) of the proof of [34, Proposition
2.2]. See [29, Corollary B.2] for the generalization to Pp. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 5.5. Any limit point P of (Pn)
∞
n=1 in P
p(Ω) is a MFG pre-solution.
Proof. We abuse notation somewhat by assume that Pn → P , with the understanding that this is
along a subsequence. We check that P satisfies the four conditions of Lemma 4.3.
(1) Of course,
Pn ◦ (ξ, B,W )
−1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦ (ξ
i, B,W i)−1 = λ×Wm0 ×Wm,
where Wk denotes Wiener measure on Ck. Thus P ◦ (ξ, B,W )−1 = λ×Wm0 ×Wm as well.
On Ωn, we know σ(W
i
s −W
i
t , Bs −Bt : i = 1, . . . , n, s ∈ [t, T ]) is Pn-independent of F
n
t for
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each t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows that, on Ω, σ(Ws −Wt, Bs −Bt : s ∈ [t, T ]) is Pn-independent of
Fξ,B,W,µ,Λ,Xt . Hence B and W are Wiener processes on (Ω, (F
ξ,B,W,µ,Λ,X
t )t∈[0,T ], P ).
(2) Fix bounded continuous functions φ : Rd × Cm → R and ψ : Cm0 × Pp(X ) → R. Since
(ξ1,W 1), . . . , (ξn,Wn) are i.i.d. under Pn with common law P ◦ (ξ,W )−1 for each n, the
law of large numbers implies
lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
φ(ξi,W i)− EP [φ(ξ,W )]
∣∣∣∣∣ψ(B, µ̂[Λn])
]
= 0.
This implies
E
P [φ(ξ,W )ψ(B, µ)] = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pn
[
φ(ξi,W i)ψ(B, µ̂[Λn])
]
= EP [φ(ξ,W )] lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pn [ψ(B, µ̂[Λn])]
= EP [φ(ξ,W )]EP [ψ(B, µ)] .
This shows (B, µ) is independent of (ξ,W ) under P . Since ξi and W i are independent
under Pn, it follows that ξ and W are independent under Pn, for each n. Thus ξ and W are
independent under P , and we conclude that ξ, W , and (B, µ) are independent under P .
(3) Let φ : X → R and ψ : Cm0 × Pp(X )→ R be bounded and continuous. Then
E
P [ψ(B, µ)φ(W,Λ, X)] = lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
ψ(B, µ̂[Λn])
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(W i,Λn,i, X i[Λn])
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
ψ(B, µ̂[Λn])
∫
X
φdµ̂[Λn]
]
= EP
[
ψ(B, µ)
∫
X
φdµ
]
.
(4) Since (ξi, B,W i, µ̂[Λn],Λn,i, X i[Λn]) verify the state SDE under Pn, the canonical processes
(ξ, B,W, µ,Λ, X) verify the state equation (4.1) under each Pn, for each n. It follows from
the results of Kurtz and Protter [28] that the state equation holds under the limit measure
P as well.

5.3. Modified finite-player games. The last step of the proof, executed in the next Section 5.4, is
to show that any limit P of Pn is optimal. This step is more involved, and we devote this subsection
to studying a useful technical device which we call the k-modified n-player game, in which agent k
is removed from the empirical measures. Intuitively, if the n-player game is modified so that the
empirical measure (present in the state process dynamics and objective functions) no longer includes
agent k, then the optimization problem of agent k de-couples from that of the other agents; agent k
may then treat the empirical measure of the other n− 1 agents as fixed and thus faces exactly the
type of control problem encountered in the MFG. Let us make this idea precise.
For β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann(En), define Y
−k[β] = (Y −k,1[β], . . . , Y −k,n[β]) to be the unique
strong solution on (Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn) of the SDE
Y −k,it [β] = ξ
i +
∫ t
0
∫
A
b(s, Y −k,is [β], µ̂
−k,x
s [β], a)β
i
s(da)dt+
∫ t
0
σ(s, Y −k,is [β], µ̂
−k,x
s [β])dW
i
s
+
∫ t
0
σ0(s, Y
−k,i
s [β], µ̂
−k,x
s [β])dBs,
µ̂−k,x[β] :=
1
n− 1
n∑
i6=k
δY −k,i[β].
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Define also
µ̂−k[β] =
1
n− 1
n∑
i6=k
δ(W i,βi,Y −k,i[β]).
Intuitively, Y −k,i is agent i’s state process in an analog of the n-player game, in which agent k has
been removed from the empirical measure. Naturally, for fixed k, the k-modified state processes
Y −k[β] should not be far from the true state processes X [β] if n is large, and we will quantify this
precisely. We will need to be somewhat explicit about the choice of metric on V , so we define dV by
dpV(q, q
′) := T ℓ[0,T ]×A(q/T, q
′/T ) = inf
γ
∫
[0,T ]2×A2
(|t− t′|p + |a− a′|p)γ(dt, dt′, da, da′),
where the infimum is over measures γ on [0, T ]2 × A2 with marginals q and q′. By choosing γ =
dtδt(dt
′)qt(da)q
′
t(da
′), we note that
dpV (q, q
′) ≤ 2p−1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pqt(da)dt+ 2
p−1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pq′t(da)dt. (5.4)
Define the p′-Wasserstein distance ℓX ,p′ on P
p′(X ) with respect to the metric
dX ((w, q, x), (w
′, q′, x′)) := ‖w − w′‖T + dV(q, q
′) + ‖x− x′‖T . (5.5)
Lemma 5.6. There exists a constant c8 > 0 such that, for each n ≥ k ≥ 1 and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈
Ann(En), we have
E
Pn
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(µ̂
−k[β], µ̂[β]) +
∥∥Xk[β]− Y −k,k[β]∥∥p′
T
]
≤ c8(1 +M [β])/n, where
M [β] := EPn
[
|ξ1|p
′
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βit(da)dt
]
.
Proof. Throughout the proof, n is fixed, expected values are all with respect to Pn, and the notation
[β] is omitted. Define the truncated p′-Wasserstein distance ℓt on Pp
′
(Cd) by
ℓpt (µ, ν) := inf
{∫
Cd×Cd
‖x− y‖p
′
t γ(dx, dy) : γ ∈ P(C
d × Cd) has marginals µ, ν
}
(5.6)
Apply the Doob’s maximal inequality and Jensen’s inequality (using the assumption p′ ≥ 2) to find
a constant C > 0 (which will change from line to line but depends only on d, p, p′, T , c1, and c5)
such that
E
[
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
t
]
≤CE
∫ t
0
∫
A
|b(s,X is, µ̂
x
s , a)− b(s, Y
−k,i
s , µ̂
−k,x
s , a)|
p′βis(da)ds
+ CE
∫ t
0
∣∣σ(s,X is, µ̂xs )− σ(s, Y −k,is , µ̂−k,xs )∣∣p′ ds
+ CE
∫ t
0
∣∣σ0(s,X is, µ̂xs )− σ0(s, Y −k,is , µ̂−k,xs )∣∣p′ ds
≤CE
∫ t
0
(
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
s + ℓ
p′
s (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x)
)
ds.
The last line followed from the Lipschitz assumption (A.4), along with the observation that
ℓRd,p(ν
1
s , ν
2
s ) ≤ ℓRd,p′(ν
1
s , ν
2
s ) ≤ ℓs(ν
1, ν2),
for each ν1, ν2 ∈ Pp(Cd). By Gronwall’s inequality (updating the constant C),
E
[
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
t
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
ℓp
′
s (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x)ds. (5.7)
Now we define a standard coupling of the empirical measures µ̂x and µ̂−k,x: first, draw a number j
from {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random, and considerXj to be a sample from µ̂x. If j 6= k, choose Y −k,j
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to be a sample from µ̂−k,x, but if j = k, draw another number j′ from {1, . . . , n}\{k} uniformly at
random, and choose Y −k,j
′
to be a sample from µ̂−k,x. This yields
ℓp
′
t (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x) ≤
1
n
n∑
i6=k
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
t +
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i6=k
‖Xk − Y −k,i‖p
′
t (5.8)
We know from Lemma 5.1 that
1
n− 1
n∑
i6=k
E[‖X i‖p
′
T ] ≤ c5(1 +M),
It should be clear that an analog of Lemma 5.1 holds for Y −k,i as well, with the same constant. In
particular,
1
n− 1
n∑
i6=k
E[‖Y −k,i‖p
′
T ] ≤ c5(1 +M).
Combine the above four inequalities, averaging (5.7) over i 6= k, to get
E
[
ℓp
′
t (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x)
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
ℓp
′
s (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x)ds+ 2p
′
c5(1 +M)/n.
Gronwall’s inequality yields a new constant such that
E
[
ℓp
′
T (µ̂
x, µ̂−k,x)
]
≤ C(1 +M)/n.
Return to (5.7) to find
E
[
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
T
]
≤ C(1 +M)/n, for i = 1, . . . , n. (5.9)
The same coupling argument leading to (5.8) also yields
ℓp
′
X ,p′(µ̂, µ̂
−k) ≤
1
n
n∑
i6=k
‖X i − Y −k,i‖p
′
T
+
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i6=k
dp
′
X ((W
i, βi, Y −k,i), (W k, βk, Xk)) (5.10)
Using (5.4), we find yet another constant such that
E
[
dp
′
X ((W
i, βi, Y −k,i), (W k, βk, Xk))
]
≤ 3p
′−1
E
[
‖W i −W k‖p
′
T + d
p′
V (β
i, βk) + ‖Y −k,i −Xk‖p
′
T
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βit(da)dt+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βkt (da)dt
+ ‖W 1‖p
′
T + |Y
−k,i‖p
′
T + ‖X
k‖p
′
T
]
≤ C
(
2nM + 2nc5(1 +M) + E[‖W
1‖p
′
T ]
)
.
Thus
1
n− 1
n∑
i6=k
E
[
dp
′
X ((W
i, βi, Y −k,i), (W k, βk, Xk))
]
≤ C(1 +M).
Applying this bound and (5.9) to (5.10) completes the proof. 
28 DANIEL LACKER
5.4. Optimality in the limit. Before we complete the proof, recall the definitions of R, A, and
A∗ from Section 4. The final step is to show that P ∈ RA∗(P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1), for any limit P
of (Pn)
∞
n=1. The idea of the proof is to use the density of adapted controls (see Lemma 4.7) to
construct nearly optimal controls for the MFG with nice continuity properties. From these controls
we build admissible controls for the n-player game, and it must finally be argued that the inequality
obtained from the ǫn-Nash assumption on Λn may be passed to the limit.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Let P be a limit point of (Pn)
∞
n=1, which we know exists by Lemma 5.5, and
again abuse notation by assuming that Pn → P . Let ρ := P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1. We know from Lemma
5.4 that P is a MFG pre-solution, and in light of Lemma 5.5 we need only to check that P is optimal.
Fix some Q∗ ∈ A∗(ρ), and set P ∗ := R(Q∗). (Lemma 4.5 assures us that A∗(ρ) is nonempty.) By
Lemma 4.7, there exist compact adapted functions φi : Ω0 × Pp(X ) → V (see Definition 4.6) such
that
(1) φi(ω, ·) is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω0, and
(2) Q∗ = limi→∞Qi, and J(R(Q∗)) = limi→∞ J(R(Qi)), where
Qi := ρ ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ, φi(ξ, B,W, µ))
−1.
Fix δ > 0, and find i0 large enough that
J(R(Qi0 )) ≥ J(R(Q
∗))− δ = sup
P ′∈RA∗(ρ)
J(P ′)− δ. (5.11)
Set Q˜ := Qi0 and φ˜ := φi0 , for ease of notation; we will use no other φi or Qi from now on. For
1 ≤ k ≤ n, let
ρn,k := Pn ◦ (ξ
k, B,W k, µ̂−k[Λn])−1,
and
Qn,k := ρn,k ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ, φ˜(ξ, B,W, µ))
−1
= Pn ◦
(
ξk, B,W k, µ̂−k[Λn], φ˜(ξk, B,W k, µ̂−k[Λn])
)−1
.
It follows from Lemma 5.6 that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
ρn,k = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
Pn ◦ (ξ
k, B,W k, µ̂[Λn])−1 = ρ.
Since
1
n
n∑
k=1
ρn,k ◦ (ξ, B,W )
−1 = P ◦ (ξ, B,W )−1
does not depend on n, the continuity of φ˜(ω, ·) for each ω ∈ Ω0 implies (using e.g. [29, Lemma A.3]
to deal with the possible discontinuity of φ˜ in ω)
Q˜ = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
Qn,k.
It is fairly straightforward to check that R is a linear map, and it is even more straightforward
to check that J is linear. Moreover, since φ˜ is a compact function, the continuity of R and J of
Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 imply
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
J(R(Qn,k)) = lim
n→∞
J
(
R
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
Qn,k
))
= J(R(Q˜))
≥ sup
P ′∈RA(ρ)
J(P ′)− δ, (5.12)
where the last step used (5.11).
Now, for k ≤ n, define βn,k ∈ An(En) by
βn,k := φ˜
(
ξk, B,W k, µ̂−k[Λn]
)
.
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For β ∈ An(En), abbreviate (Λn,−k, β) := ((Λn)−k, β). Since agent k is removed from the empirical
measure, we have µ̂−k[Λn] = µ̂−k[(Λn,−k, β)] for any β ∈ An(En). The key point is that for each
k ≤ n,
Pn ◦
(
ξk, B,W k, µ̂−k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Y −k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)−1
= R(Qn,k). (5.13)
To prove (5.13), let P ′ denote the measure on the left-hand side. Since µ̂−k[Λn] = µ̂−k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)],
we have
P ′ ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ,Λ)−1 = Qn,k.
Since the processes (
ξk, B,W k, µ̂−k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Y −k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)
verify the state SDE (4.1) on (Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn), the canonical processes (ξ, B,W, µ,Λ, X) verify
the state SDE (4.1) under P ′. Hence, P ′ = R(Qn,k). With (5.13) in hand, by definition of J the
inequality (5.12) then translates to
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
[
Γ
(
µ̂−k,x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Y −k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)]
≥ sup
P ′∈RA(ρ)
J(P ′)− δ. (5.14)
Before completing the proof, we check more technical point:
0 = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
[
Γ
(
µ̂−k,x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Y −k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)
−Γ
(
µ̂x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Xk[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)]
(5.15)
Indeed, it follows from Lemma 5.1 (and an obvious analog for the modified state processes Y ) that
Zn,k := E
Pn
[
‖Xk[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]‖p
′
T + ‖Y
−k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]‖p
′
T
+
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ̂
x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)](dz) +
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ̂
−k,x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)](dz)
]
≤ 4c4E
Pn
[
|ξ1|p
′
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,it (da)dt+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βn,kt (da)dt
]
.
Lemma 5.4 says that
sup
n
E
Pn
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λn,it (da)dt
]
<∞.
Compactness of φ˜ implies that there exists a compact set K ⊂ A such that β˜n,kt (K
c) = 0 for a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ] and all n ≥ k ≥ 1. Thus
sup
n
1
n
n∑
k=1
Zn,k <∞,
and we have the uniform integrability needed to deduce (5.15), from Lemma 5.6 and from the
continuity and growth assumptions (A.5) on f and g.
A simple manipulation of the definitions yields J(Pn) =
1
n
∑n
k=1 Jk(Λ
n). Then, since Pn → P ,
the upper semicontinuity of J of Lemma 4.5 implies
J(P ) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jk(Λ
n).
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Finally, use the fact that Λn is a relaxed ǫn-Nash equilibrium to get
J(P ) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
[
Jk((Λ
n,−k, βn,k))− ǫnk
]
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
[
Γ
(
µ̂x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Xk[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)]
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
Pn
[
Γ
(
µ̂−k,x[(Λn,−k, βn,k)], βn,k, Y −k,k[(Λn,−k, βn,k)]
)]
≥ sup
P ′∈RA(ρ)
J(P ′)− δ
The second line follows from the definition of Jk, and the ǫ
n
k drops out because of the hypothesis
(2.7). The third line comes from (5.15), and the last is from (5.14). Since P ∈ RA(ρ), and since
δ > 0 was arbitrary, this shows that P ∈ RA∗(ρ). 
6. Proof of Theorem 2.11
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.11, which we split into two pieces.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Let P ∈ P(Ω) be a weak MFG solution. Then
there exist, for each n,
(1) ǫn ≥ 0,
(2) an n-player environment En = (Ωn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],Pn, ξ, B,W ), and
(3) a relaxed (ǫn, . . . , ǫn)-Nash equilibrium Λ
n = (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n) on En,
such that limn→∞ ǫn = 0 and Pn → P in Pp(Ω), where
Pn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pn ◦
(
ξi, B,W i, µ̂[Λn],Λn,i, X i[Λn]
)−1
.
Theorem 6.1 is nearly the same as Theorem 2.11, except that the equilibria Λn are now relaxed
instead of strong, and the environments En are now part of the conclusion of the theorem instead of
the input. We will prove Theorem 6.1 by constructing a convenient sequence of environments En,
which all live on the same larger probability space supporting an i.i.d. sequence of state processes
corresponding to the given MFG solution. This kind of argument is known as trajectorial propagation
of chaos in the literature on McKean-Vlasov limits, and the Lipschitz assumption in the measure
argument is useful here. The precise choice of environments also facilitates the proof of the following
Proposition. Recall the definition of a strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium from Remark 2.3 and the discussion
preceding it.
Proposition 6.2. Let En be the environments defined in the proof of Theorem 6.1 (in Section 6.1).
Let Λ0 = (Λ0,1, . . . ,Λ0,n) ∈ Ann(En). Then there exist strong strategies Λ
k = (Λk,1, . . . ,Λk,n) ∈
Ann(En) such that:
(1) In Pp
(
Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn × (Cd)n
)
,
lim
k→∞
Pn ◦
(
B,W,Λk, X [Λk]
)−1
= Pn ◦
(
B,W,Λ0, X [Λ0]
)−1
,
(2) limk→∞ Ji(Λ
k) = Ji(Λ
0), for i = 1, . . . , n,
(3)
lim sup
k→∞
sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
k,−i, β)) ≤ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
0,−i, β)), for i = 1, . . . , n.
In particular, if Λ0 is a relaxed ǫ0 = (ǫ01, . . . , ǫ
0
n)-Nash equilibrium, then Λ
k is a strong (ǫ0+ǫk)-Nash
equilibrium, where
ǫki :=
[
sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
k,−i, β))− Ji(Λ
k)− ǫ0i
]+
→ 0 as k →∞.
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Proof of Theorem 2.11. Recall that strong strategies are insensitive to the choice of n-player en-
vironment (see Remark 2.12), and so it suffices to prove the theorem on any given sequence of
environments, such as those provided by Theorem 6.1. By Theorem 6.1 we may find ǫn → 0 and a
relaxed (ǫn, . . . , ǫn)-Nash equilibrium Λ
n for the n-player game, with the desired convergence proper-
ties. Then, by Proposition 6.2, we find for each n each k a strong ǫn,k = (ǫn+ǫ
n,k
1 , . . . , ǫn+ǫ
n,k
n )-Nash
equilibrium Λn,k ∈ Ann(En) with the convergence properties defined in Proposition 6.2. For each n,
choose kn large enough to make ǫ
n,kn
i ≤ 2
−n for each i = 1, . . . , n and so that the sequences in (1-3)
of Proposition 6.2 are each within 2−n of their respective limits. 
6.1. Construction of environments. Fix a weak MFG solution P . Define PB,µ := P ◦ (B, µ)−1.
We will work on the space
Ω := [0, 1]× Cm0 × Pp(X )×X∞.
Let (U,B, µ, (W i,Λi, Y i)∞i=1) denote the identity map (i.e. coordinate processes) on Ω. For n ∈
N ∪ {∞}, consider the complete filtration (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ] generated by U , B, µ, and (W
i,Λi, Y i)ni=1,
that is the completion of
σ
{(
U,Bs, µ(C1), (W
i
s ,Λ
i([0, s]× C2), Y
i
s )
n
i=1
)
: s ≤ t, C1 ∈ F
X
t , C2 ∈ B(A)
}
.
Define the probability measure P on (Ω,F
∞
T ) by
P := duPB,µ(dβ, dν)
∞∏
i=1
ν(dwi, dqi, dyi).
By construction,
P ◦ (Y i0 , B,W
i, µ,Λi, Y i)−1 = P, for each i,
and (W i,Λi, Y i)∞i=1 are conditionally i.i.d. with common law µ given (B, µ). Moreover, U and
(B, µ, (W i,Λi, Y i)∞i=1) are independent under P. We will work with the n-player environments
En :=
(
Ω, (F
n
t )t∈[0,T ],P, (Y
1
0 , . . . , Y
n
0 ), B, (W
1, . . . ,Wn)
)
,
and we will show that the canonical process (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) is a relaxed (ǫn, . . . , ǫn)-Nash equilibrium
for some ǫn → ∞. Including the seemingly superfluous random variable U makes the class of
admissible controls as rich as possible, in a sense which will be more clear later; until the proof of
Proposition 6.2, U will be behind the scenes.
DefineX [β] and µ̂[β] for β ∈ Ann(En) as usual, as in Section 2.3. For each (F
∞
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressive
P(A)-valued process β on Ω and each i ≥ 1, define Y i[β] to be the unique solution of the SDE
dY it [β] =
∫
A
b(t, Y it [β], µ
x
t , a)βt(da) + σ(t, Y
i
t [β], µ
x
t )dW
i
t + σ0(t, Y
i
t [β], µ
x
t )dBt, Y
i
0 [β] = Y
i
0 .
Note that if β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann(En) then X
i[β] differs from Y i[βi] only in the measure flow
which appears in the dynamics; X i[β] depends on the empirical measure flow of (X1[β], . . . , Xn[β]),
whereas Y i[βi] depends on the random measure µ coming from the MFG solution. Define the
canonical n-player strategy profile by
Λ
n
= (Λ
n,1
, . . . ,Λ
n,n
) := (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Ann(En).
This abbreviation serves in part to indicate which n we are working with at any given moment, so
that we can suppress the index n from the rest of the notation. Note that Y i[Λ
n,i
] = Y i[Λi] = Y i.
6.2. Trajectorial propagation of chaos. Intuition from the theory of propagation of chaos sug-
gests that the state processes (Y 1, . . . , Y n) and (X1, . . . , Xn) should be close in some sense, and the
purpose of this section is to make this quantitative. For β ∈ An(En), abbreviate
(Λ
n,−i
, β) := ((Λ
n
)−i, β) ∈ Ann(En).
Recall the definition of the metric dX on X from (5.5), and again define the p′-Wasserstein metric
ℓX ,p′ on P
p(X ) relative to the metric dX .
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Lemma 6.3. Fix i and a (F
∞
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressive P (A)-valued process β, and define
ν̂n,i[β] :=
1
n
 n∑
k 6=i
δ(Wk,Λk,Y k) + δ(W i,β,Y i[β])
 .
There exists a sequence δn > 0 converging to zero such that
E
P
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n,i[β], µ)
]
≤ δn
(
1 + EP
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
.
Proof. Expectations are all with respect to P throughout the proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n define
ν̂n :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(Wk,Λk,Y k).
Using the obvious coupling, we find
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n,i[β], ν̂n) ≤
1
n
dp
′
X
(
(W i,Λi, Y i), (W i, β, Y i[β])
)
.
Using (5.4), we find a constant C > 0, depending only on p, p′, and T , such that
E
[
dp
′
X
(
(W i,Λi, Y i), (W i, β, Y i[β])
)]
≤CE
[∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λit(da)dt
+ ‖Y i‖p
′
T + ‖Y
i[β]‖p
′
T
]
Analogously to Lemma 5.1, it holds that
E[‖Y i[β]‖p
′
T ] ≤ c5E
[
1 + |Y i0 |
p′ +
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ
x(dz) +
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
]
. (6.1)
Note that E
∫
Cd ‖z‖
p′
T µ
x(dz) <∞ and that E[|Y i0 |
p′ ] = E[|Y 10 |
p′ ] <∞. Apply (6.1) also with β = Λi,
we find a new constant, still called C and still independent of n, such that
E
[
dp
′
X
(
(W i,Λi, Y i), (W i, β, Y i[β])
)]
≤ C
(
1 + E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
.
Finally, recall that (W k,Λk, Y k)∞k=1 are conditionally i.i.d. given (B, µ) with common conditional
law µ. Since also they are p′-integrable, it follows from the law of large numbers that
lim
n→∞
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n, µ)
]
= 0.
Complete the proof by using the triangle inequality to get
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n,i[β], µ)
]
≤
C2p
′−1
n
(
1 + E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
+ 2p
′−1
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n, µ)
]
.

Lemma 6.4. There is a sequence δn > 0 converging to zero such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each
β ∈ An(En),
E
P
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(µ̂[(Λ
n,−i
, β)], µ) +
∥∥∥X i[(Λn,−i, β)]− Y i[β]∥∥∥p′
T
]
≤ δn
(
1 + EP
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.6, and we work again with the truncated p′-
Wasserstein distances ℓt on Cd defined in (5.6). Throughout this proof, n and i are fixed, and
expectations are all with respect to P. Abbreviate X
k
= Xk[(Λ
n,−i
, β)] and µ̂ = µ̂[(Λ
n,−i
, β)]
throughout. Define Y
i
:= Y i[β] and Y
k
:= Y k for k 6= i. As in the proof of Lemma 5.6, we use the
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Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality followed by Gronwall’s inequality to find a constant C1 > 0,
depending only on c1, p
′, and T , such that
E
[
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
t
]
≤ C1E
∫ t
0
ℓp
′
s (µ̂
x, µx)ds, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (6.2)
Define ν̂n,i = ν̂n,i[β] as in Lemma 6.3, and write ν̂n,i,x := (ν̂n,i)x for the empirical distribution of
(Y
1
, . . . , Y
n
). Use (6.2) and the triangle inequality to get
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
t
]
≤ 2p
′−1C1E
∫ t
0
(
ℓp
′
s (µ̂
x, ν̂n,i,x) + ℓp
′
s (ν̂
n,i,x, µx)
)
ds
≤ 2p
′−1C1E
∫ t
0
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
s + ℓ
p′
s (ν̂
n,i,x, µx)
)
ds
By Gronwall’s inequality and Lemma 6.3, with C2 := 2
p′−1C1e
2p
′
−1C1T we have
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
t
]
≤ C2E
∫ t
0
ℓp
′
s (ν̂
n,i,x, µx)ds ≤ C2TE
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n,i, µ)
]
≤ C2Tδn
(
1 + E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
. (6.3)
The obvious coupling yields the inequality
ℓp
′
X ,p′(µ̂, ν̂
n,i) ≤
1
n
n∑
k=1
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
T ,
and then the triangle inequality implies
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(µ̂, µ)
]
≤ 2p
′−1 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[
‖X
k
− Y
k
‖p
′
T
]
+ 2p
′−1
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′(ν̂
n,i, µ)
]
.
Conclude from Lemma 6.3 and (6.3). 
6.3. Proof of Theorem 6.1. With Lemma 6.4 in hand, we begin the proof of Theorem 6.1. The
convergence Pn → P follows immediately from Lemma 6.4, and it remains only to check that Λ
n
is
a relaxed (ǫn, . . . , ǫn)-Nash equilibrium for some ǫn → 0. Define
ǫn :=
n
max
i=1
[
sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
n,−i
, β))− Ji(Λ
n
)
]
= sup
β∈An(En)
J1((Λ
n,−1
, β))− J1(Λ
n
),
where the second equality follows from exchangeability, or more precisely from the fact that (using
the notation of Remark 2.7) the measure
P ◦
(
ξpi , B,Wpi, µ̂[Λ
n
pi],Λ
n
pi , X [Λ
n
pi]pi
)−1
does not depend on the choice of permutation π. Recall that P ∈ P(Ω) was the given MFG solution,
and define ρ := P ◦ (ξ, B,W, µ)−1 so that P ∈ RA∗(ρ). For each n, find βn ∈ An(En) such that
J1((Λ
n,−1
, βn)) ≥ sup
β∈An(En)
J1((Λ
n,−1
, β)) − 1/n. (6.4)
To complete the proof, it suffices to prove the following:
lim
n→∞
J1(Λ
n
) = EP
[
Γ(µx,Λ1, Y 1)
]
, (6.5)
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣EP [Γ(µ̂x[(Λn,−1, βn)], βn, X1[(Λn,−1, βn)])− Γ(µx, βn, Y 1[βn])]∣∣∣ = 0. (6.6)
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Indeed, note that P ◦
(
ξ1, B,W 1, µ,Λ1, Y 1
)−1
= P holds by construction. Since
P ′n := P ◦
(
ξ1, B,W 1, µ, βn, Y 1[βn]
)−1
is in RA(ρ) for each n, and since P is in RA∗(ρ), we have
E
P
[
Γ(µx, βn, Y 1)
]
= J(P ) ≥ J(P ′n) = E
P
[
Γ(µx, βn, Y 1[βn])
]
, for all n.
Thus, from (6.5) and (6.6) it follows that
lim
n→∞
J1(Λ
n
) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
E
P
[
Γ(µx, βn, Y 1[βn])
]
= lim sup
n→∞
J1((Λ
n,−1
, βn))
= lim sup
n→∞
sup
β∈An(En)
J1((Λ
n,−1
, β)),
where of course in the last step we have used (6.4). Since ǫn ≥ 0, this shows ǫn → 0.
Proof of (6.5): First, apply Lemma 6.4 with β = Λ1 (so that (Λ
n,−1
, β) = Λ
n
) to get
lim
n→∞
P ◦
(
Y 10 , B,W
1, µ̂[Λ
n
],Λ1, X1[Λ
n
]
)−1
= P ◦
(
Y 10 , B,W
1, µ,Λ1, Y 1
)−1
,
where the limit is taken in Pp(Ω). Moreover, since EP
∫ T
0
∫
A |a|
p′Λ1t (da)dt <∞, we use the continuity
of J of Lemma 4.5 (since the additional uniform integrability condition holds trivially) to conclude
that
lim
n→∞
J1(Λ
n
) = lim
n→∞
E
P
[
Γ(µ̂x[Λ
n
],Λ1, X1[Λ
n
])
]
= EP
[
Γ(µx,Λ1, Y 1)
]
.
Proof of (6.6): This step is fairly involved and thus divided into several steps. The first two steps
identify a relative compactness for the laws of the empirical measure and state process pairs, crucial
for the third and fourth steps below. Step (3) focuses on the g term, and Step (4) uses the additional
assumption B to deal with the f term.
Proof of (6.6), Step (1): We show first that
sup
n
E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βnt (da)dt <∞. (6.7)
By (6.4) and Lemma 5.2(2), we have
E
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)βnt (da)dt ≤ c7E
[
1 +
1
n
+ |ξ1|p +
1
n
n∑
i=2
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛit(da)dt
]
= c7E
[
1 +
1
n
+ |ξ1|p +
n− 1
n
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛ1t (da)dt
]
,
where the second line follows from symmetry. Since E[|ξ1|p] < ∞ and E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛ1t (da)dt < ∞,
we have proven (6.7).
Proof of (6.6), Step (2): Define AR for R > 0 to be the set of (F
∞
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressive P(A)-valued
processes β such that
E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt ≤ R.
According to (6.7), there exists R > 0 such that βn ∈ AR for all n. Define also
SR :=
{
P ◦
(
µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]
)−1
: n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR
}
.
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We show next that SR is relatively compact in Pp(Pp(Cd) × Cd). Note first that it follows from
Lemma 5.1 that
sup
{
E
P
∫
Cd
‖z‖p
′
T µ̂
x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)](dz) : n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR
}
<∞. (6.8)
By symmetry, we have{
P ◦ (X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1 : n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR
}
=
{
1
n
n∑
k=1
P ◦ (Xk[(Λ
n,−k
, β)])−1 : n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR
}
,
and by Proposition 5.3 this set is relatively compact in Pp(Cd). For β ∈ AR, the mean measure of
P ◦ (µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1 is exactly
1
n
n∑
k=1
P ◦ (Xk[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1,
and it follows again from Proposition 5.3 that the family{
1
n
n∑
k=1
P ◦ (Xk[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1 : n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR
}
is relatively compact in Pp(Cd). From this and (6.8) we conclude that P ◦ (µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1 are
relatively compact in Pp(Pp(Cd)). Hence, SR is relatively compact. (See Corollary B.2 and Lemma
A.2 of [29] regarding these last two conclusions.)
Proof of (6.6), Step (3): Since βn ∈ AR for each n, to prove (6.6) it suffices to show that
sup
β∈AR
Iβn → 0, (6.9)
where
Iβn := E
[
Γ(µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], β,X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]) − Γ(µx, β, Y 1[β])
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
(
f(t,X1t [(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µ̂xt [(Λ
n,−1
, β)], a)− f(t, Y 1t [β], µ
x
t , a)
)
βt(da)dt
]
+ E
[
g(X1T [(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µ̂xT [(Λ
n,−1
, β)])− g(Y 1T [β], µ
x
T )
]
.
We start with the g term. Define
Qβn := P ◦ (µ̂
x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)])−1,
Qβ := P ◦ (µx, Y 1[β])−1.
Using the metric on Pp(Cd)× Cd given by
((µ, x), (µ′, x′)) 7→
[
ℓp
Cd,p
(µ, µ′) + ‖x− x′‖pT
]1/p
,
we define the p-Wasserstein metric ℓPp(Cd)×Cd,p on P
p(Pp(Cd)× Cd). By Lemma 6.4, we have
ℓp
′
Pp(Cd)×Cd,p
(Qβn, Q
β) ≤ E
[
ℓp
Cd,p
(
µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µx
)
+ ‖X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]− Y 1[β]‖pT
]p′/p
≤ 2p
′/p−1
E
[
ℓp
′
X ,p′
(
µ̂[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µ
)
+ ‖X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]− Y 1[β]‖p
′
T
]
≤ 2p
′/p−1δn(1 +R),
and thus Qβn → Q
β in Pp(Pp(Cd)× Cd), uniformly in β ∈ AR. The function
Pp(Pp(Cd)× Cd) ∋ Q 7→
∫
Q(dν, dx)g(xT , νT )
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is continuous, and so its restriction to the closure of SR is uniformly continuous. Thus, since
{Qβn : n ≥ 1, β ∈ AR} ⊂ SR,
lim
n→∞
sup
β∈AR
∣∣∣E [g(X1T [(Λn,−1, β)], µ̂xT [(Λn,−1, β)])− g(Y 1T [β], µxT )]∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof of (6.6), Step (4): To deal with the f term in Iβn it will be useful to define G : P
p(Cd)×Cd → R
by
G
(
(µ1, x1), (µ2, x2)
)
:=
∫ T
0
sup
a∈A
∣∣f(t, x1t , µ1t , a)− f(t, x2t , µ2t , a)∣∣ dt
With the g term taken care of in Step (3) above, the proof of (6.9) and thus the theorem will be
complete if we show that
0 = lim
n→∞
sup
β∈AR
E
[
Znβ
]
, where (6.10)
Znβ := G
(
(µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]), (µx, Y 1[β])
)
.
Fix η > 0, and note that by relative compactness of SR we may find (e.g. by [35, Theorem 7.12]) a
compact set K ⊂ Pp(Cd)× Cd such that, if the event Kβ is defined by
Kβ :=
{(
µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)]
)
∈ K
}
,
then
E
[(
1 +
∫
Cd
‖z‖pT µ̂
x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)](dz) + ‖X1[(Λ
n,−1
, β)‖pT
)
1Kc
β
]
≤ η,
for all n ≥ 1 and β ∈ AR. Sending n→∞, it follows from Lemma 6.4 that also
E
[(
1 +
∫
Cd
‖z‖pTµ
x(dz) + ‖Y 1[β]‖pT
)
1Kc
β
]
≤ η.
Hence, the growth condition of Assumption B implies
E
[
1Kc
β
Znβ
]
≤ c4η, (6.11)
for all n ≥ 1 and β ∈ AR. AssumptionB implies that G is continuous, and thus uniformly continuous
on K ×K. We will check next that E[1KβZ
n
β ] converges to zero, uniformly in β ∈ AR. Indeed, by
uniform continuity there exists η0 > 0 such that if (µ
1, x1), (µ2, x2) ∈ K and G((µ1, x1), (µ2, x2)) > η
then ‖x1 − x2‖T + ℓCd,p(µ
1, µ2) > η0. Thus, since G is bounded on K ×K, say by C > 0, we use
Markov’s inequality and Lemma 6.4 to conclude that
E
[
1KβZ
n
β
]
≤ η + CP
{∥∥∥X1[(Λn,−1, β)]− Y 1[β]∥∥∥
T
+ ℓCd,p
(
µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µx
)
> η0
}
≤ η + 2p
′−1Cη−p
′
0 E
[∥∥∥X1[(Λn,−1, β)]− Y 1[β]∥∥∥p′
T
+ ℓp
′
Cd,p
(
µ̂x[(Λ
n,−1
, β)], µx
)]
≤ η + 2p
′−1Cη−p
′
0 δn
(
1 + E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βt(da)dt
)
≤ η + 2p
′−1Cη−p
′
0 δn(1 +R),
whenever β ∈ AR, where δn → 0 is from Lemma 6.4. Combining this with (6.11), we get
lim sup
n→∞
sup
β∈AR
E
[
Znβ
]
≤ (1 + c4)η.
This holds for each η > 0, completing the proof of (6.10) and thus of the theorem. 
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6.4. Proof of Proposition 6.2. Throughout the section, the number of agents n is fixed, and we
work on the n-player environment En specified in Section 6.1. The proof of Proposition 6.2 is split
into two main steps. In this first step, we approximate the relaxed strategy Λ0 by bounded strong
strategies, and we check the convergences (1) and (2) claimed in Proposition 6.2. The second step
verifies the somewhat more subtle inequality (3) of Proposition 6.2.
Remark 6.5. Propositions 6.2, 2.4, and 3.3 are really just instances of the density of strong (and
strict) controls in the class of weak controls, in a sense made precise by Lemma 4.7. Indeed, a
consequence of Lemma 4.7 may be stated more transparently as follows. Suppose (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P )
is a filtered probability space supporting a (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process W˜ (of any dimension), an F0-
measurable random variable ξ˜ living in some Euclidean space, and a progressively measurable P(A)-
valued process (Λ˜t)t∈[0,T ], satisfying E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt < ∞. Then, if Gt := σ(ξ˜, W˜s : s ≤ t),
then there exists a sequence (αk)∞k=1 of (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable A-valued processes such
that
lim
k→∞
P ◦
(
ξ˜, W˜ , dtδαkt (da)
)−1
= P ◦
(
ξ˜, W˜ , dtΛ˜t(da)
)−1
,
and
lim
r→∞
sup
k
E
P
[∫ T
0
|αkt |
p′1{|αkt |>r}dt
]
<∞.
Before we prove Proposition 6.2, we need the following lemma, which is a simple variant of a
standard result:
Lemma 6.6. Suppose Λ˜k = (Λ˜k,1, . . . , Λ˜k,n) ∈ Ann(En) is such that
lim
k→∞
P ◦ (ξ, B,W, Λ˜k)−1 = P ◦ (ξ, B,W,Λ0)−1,
with the limit taken in Pp((Rd)n × Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn). Then
lim
k→∞
P ◦
(
B,W, Λ˜k, X [Λ˜k]
)−1
= P ◦
(
B,W,Λ0, X [Λ0]
)−1
,
in Pp(Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn × (Cd)n).
Proof. This is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.4, given in [11], which is itself an instance of a
standard method proving weak convergence of SDE solutions, so we only sketch the proof. It can
be shown as in Proposition 5.3 that {P ◦ (X [Λ˜k])−1 : k ≥ 1} is relatively compact in Pp((Cd)n), and
thus {P ◦
(
B,W, Λ˜k, X [Λ˜k]
)−1
: k ≥ 1} is relatively compact in Pp(Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn × (Cd)n).
Using the results of Kurtz and Protter [28], it is straightforward to check that under any limit point
the canonical processes satsify a certain SDE, and the claimed convergence follows from uniqueness
of the SDE solution. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6.2.
Step 1: Define V analogously to V , but with A replaced by An. That is, V is the set of measures q
on [0, T ]×An with first marginal equal to Lebesgue measure and with∫
[0,T ]×An
n∑
i=1
|ai|
pq(dt, da1, . . . , dan) <∞.
Endow V with the p-Wasserstein metric. Define
Λ
0
t (da1, . . . , dan) :=
n∏
i=1
Λ0,it (dai),
and identify this P(An)-valued process with the random element Λ
0
:= dtΛ
0
t (da) of V. By Lemma
4.7 (see also Remark 6.5), with A replaced by An, there exists a sequence of bounded An-valued
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processes αk = (αk,1, . . . , αk,n) such that, if we define
Λ
k
:= dtδαkt (da1, . . . , dan) = dt
n∏
i=1
δαk,it
(dai),
then we have
lim
r→∞
sup
k
E
P
[∫ T
0
|αkt |
p′1{|αkt |>r}dt
]
= 0 (6.12)
and
lim
k→∞
P ◦
(
ξ, B,W,Λ
k
)−1
= P ◦
(
ξ, B,W,Λ
0
)−1
,
in Pp((Rd)n×Cm0×(Cm)n×V). Defining πi : [0, T ]×An → [0, T ]×A by πi(t, a1, . . . , an) := (t, ai), we
note that the map V ∋ q 7→ q◦π−1i ∈ V is continuous. Define Λ
k,i
t := δαk,it
and Λk = (Λk,1, . . . ,Λk,n),
and conclude that
lim
k→∞
P ◦
(
ξ, B,W,Λk
)−1
= P ◦
(
ξ, B,W,Λ0
)−1
,
in Pp((Rd)n × Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn), for each k. By Lemma 6.6,
lim
k→∞
P ◦
(
B,W,Λk, X [Λk]
)−1
= P ◦
(
B,W,Λ0, X [Λ0]
)−1
,
in Pp(Cm0× (Cm)n×Vn× (Cd)n). It follows from the uniform integrability (6.12) and the continuity
of J of Lemma 4.5 that
lim
k→∞
Ji(Λ
k) = Ji(Λ
0), i = 1, . . . , n.
This verifies (1) and (2) of Proposition 6.2.
Step 2: It remains to justify the inequality (3) of Proposition 6.2. We prove this only for i = 1,
since the cases i = 2, . . . , n are identical. For each k find βk ∈ An(En) such that
Ji((Λ
k,−1, βk)) ≥ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
k,−1, β))−
1
k
. (6.13)
First, use Lemma 5.2(2) to get
E
∫ T
0
∫
A
(|a|p
′
− c6|a|
p)βkt (da)dt ≤ c7E
[
1 +
1
k
+ |ξ1|p +
1
n
n∑
i=2
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛk,it (da)dt
]
.
Since E[|ξ1|p] <∞, and since
lim
k→∞
E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛk,it (da)dt = E
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛ0,it (da)dt <∞,
holds by construction, for i = 2, . . . , n, it follows that
R := sup
k
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
βkt (da)dt <∞.
It follows as in Proposition 5.3 (or more precisely [29, Proposition B.4]) that the set{
P ◦
(
(Λk,−1, βk), X [(Λk,−1, βk)]
)−1
: k ≥ 1
}
is relatively compact in Pp(Vn × (Cd)n). Hence, the set{
Pk := P ◦
(
B,W, (Λk,−1, βk), X [(Λk,−1, βk)]
)−1
: k ≥ 1
}
(6.14)
is relatively compact in Pp(Cm0 × (Cm)n×Vn× (Cd)n) (e.g. by [29, Lemma A.2]). By the following
Lemma 6.7, every limit point P of (Pk)
∞
k=1 is of the form
P = P ◦
(
B,W, (Λ0,−1, β), X [(Λ0,−1, β)]
)−1
, for some β ∈ An(En). (6.15)
This implies
lim sup
k→∞
Ji((Λ
k,−1, βk)) ≤ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
0,−1, β)).
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Because of (6.13), this completes the proof of Proposition 6.2.
Lemma 6.7. Every limit point P of (Pk)
∞
k=1 (defined in (6.14)) is of the form (6.15).
Proof. Let us abbreviate
Ω(n) := Cm0 × (Cm)n × Vn × (Cd)n.
Let (B,W = (W 1, . . . ,Wn),Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn), X = (X1, . . . , Xn)) denote the identity map on Ω(n),
and let (F
(n)
t )t∈[0,T ] denote the natural filtration,
F
(n)
t = σ ((Bs,Ws,Λ([0, s]× C), Xs) : s ≤ t, C ∈ B(A)) .
Fix a limit point P of Pk. It is easily verified that P satisfies
P ◦
(
X0, B,W, (Λ
2, . . . ,Λn)
)−1
= P ◦
(
X0, B,W, (Λ
0,2, . . . ,Λ0,n)
)−1
. (6.16)
Moreover, for each k, we know that B and W are independent (F
(n)
t )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener processes under
Pk, and thus this is true under P as well. Note that (B,W, (Λ
k,−1, βk), X [(Λk,−1, βk)]) satisfy the
state SDE under P, or equivalently under Pk the canonical processes verify the SDE{
dX it =
∫
A
b(t,X it , µ̂
x
t , a)Λ
i
t(da)dt+ σ(t,X
i
t , µ̂
x
t )dW
i
t + σ0(t,X
i
t , µ̂
x
t )dBt, i = 1, . . . , n
µ̂xt =
1
n
∑n
k=1 δXkt .
(6.17)
The results of Kurtz and Protter [28] imply that this passes to the limit: The canonical processes
on Ω(n) verify the same SDE under P .
It remains only to show that there exists β ∈ An(En) such that
P ◦ (X0, B,W, (Λ
0,−1, β))−1 = P ◦ (X0, B,W,Λ)
−1. (6.18)
Indeed, from uniqueness in law of the solution of the SDE (6.17) it will then follow that
P ◦ (B,W, (Λ0,−1, β), X [(Λ0,−1, β)])−1 = P.
The independent uniform random variable U built into En now finally comes into play. Using a well
known result from measure theory (e.g. [23, Theorem 5.10]) we may find a measurable function
β = (β
1
, . . . , β
n
) : [0, 1]× (Rd)n × Cm0 × (Cm)n → Vn
such that
P ◦
(
X0, B,W, β(U,X0, B,W )
)−1
= P ◦ (X0, B,W,Λ)
−1. (6.19)
Since B and W are independent (F
(n)
t )t∈[0,T ]-Wiener processes under P , it follows that
(β(U,X0, B,W )s)s∈[0,t] and σ(Bs −Bt,Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ])
are independent under P, for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, (β(U,X0, B,W )t)t∈[0,T ] is progressively measur-
able with respect to the P-completion of the filtration (σ(U,X0, Bs,Ws : s ≤ t))t∈[0,T ]. In particular,
(β(U,X0, B,W ))t∈[0,T ] ∈ A
n
n(En) and β := (β
1
(U,X0, B,W )t)t∈[0,T ] is in An(En). Now note that
(6.16) and (6.19) together imply
P ◦
(
X0, B,W,
(
β
2
(U,X0, B,W ), . . . , β
n
(U,X0, B,W )
))−1
= P ◦
(
X0, B,W, (Λ
2, . . . ,Λn)
)−1
.
On the other hand, (6.19) implies that the conditional law under P of Λ1 given (X0, B,W,Λ
2, . . . ,Λn)
is the same as the conditional law under P of β
1
(U,X0, B,W ) given(
X0, B,W, β
2
(U,X0, B,W ), . . . , β
n
(U,X0, B,W )
)
.
This completes the proof of (6.18). 
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7. Proof of Theorem 3.4
This section explains the proof of Theorem 3.4, which specializes the main results to the setting
without common noise essentially by means of the following simple observation. Note that although
we assume σ0 ≡ 0 throughout the section, weak MFG solution has the same meaning as in Definition
2.1, distinct from Definition 3.1 of weak MFG solution without common noise.
Lemma 7.1. If (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution, then (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,
Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution without common noise. Conversely, if (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X)
is a weak MFG solution without common noise, then we may construct (by enlarging the probabil-
ity space, if necessary) an m0-dimensional Wiener process B independent of (W,µ,Λ, X) such that
(Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution.
Proof. The only difficulty comes from the conditional independence required in condition (3) of both
Definitions 2.1 and 3.1, and it is convenient here to reformulate the definitions slightly. Lemma 4.3
tells us that Definition 2.1 of a weak MFG solution is equivalent to an alternative definition, in
which the conditional independence is omitted from condition (3) and is added to condition (5). To
be precise, define the following conditions:
(3.a) (Λt)t∈[0,T ] is (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt <∞.
(5.a) Suppose (Ω˜′, (F ′t)t∈[0,T ], P
′) is another filtered probability space supporting (B′,W ′, µ′,Λ′, X ′)
satisfying (3.a), (1,2,4) of Definition 2.1, and P ◦(B, µ)−1 = P ′◦(B′, µ′)−1, with σ(Λ′s : s ≤ t)
conditionally independent of F
X′0,B
′,W ′,µ′
T given F
X′0,B
′,W ′,µ′
t , for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then
E
P [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP
′
[Γ(µ′x,Λ′, X ′)].
Then, by Lemma 4.3, (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution if and only if it
satisfies Definition 2.1 with conditions (3) and (5) replaced by (3.a) and (5.a). In fact, the same is
true if (5.a) is replaced by
(5’.a) If (Λ′t)t∈[0,T ] is (F
X0,B,W,µ
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛ′t(da)dt <∞,
and if X ′ is the unique strong solution of
dX ′t =
∫
A
b(t,X ′t, µ
x
t , a)Λ
′
t(da)dt+ σ(t,X
′
t, µ
x
t )dWt, X
′
0 = X0, (7.1)
then EP [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)].
Indeed, this follows from the density of strong controls provided by Lemma 4.7 (see also Remark
6.5). Analogously, for the setting without common noise, consider the following condition:
(5’.b) If (Λ′t)t∈[0,T ] is (F
X0,W,µ
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|pΛ′t(da)dt <∞,
and if X ′ is the unique strong solution of (7.1), then EP [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)].
It is proven exactly as in Lemma 4.3 that (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution
without common noise if and only if it satisfies Definition 3.1 with conditions (3) and (5) replaced
by (3.a) and (5’.b). We are now ready to prove the lemma:
Suppose (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution. It is straightforward to check
that (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) satisfies condition (3.a) as well as (1,2,4) of Definition 3.1. Con-
dition (5) of Definition 2.1 cleary implies condition (5’.b). Finally µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | B, µ)
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implies µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ), which verifies the final condition (6) of Definition 3.1. Hence
(Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution without common noise.
Conversely, let (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,W, µ,Λ, X) be a weak MFG solution without common noise,
and assume without loss of generality that (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) supports an (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-Wiener process
B of dimension m0 which is independent of (W,µ,Λ, X). Again, condition (3.a) as well as (1), (2),
and (4) of Definition 2.1 clearly hold. The consistency condition µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | µ) and the
independence of B and (W,µ,Λ, X) imply µ = P ((W,Λ, X) ∈ · | B, µ). Finally, to check (5’.a),
note first that the independence of B and (X0,W, µ) implies easily that F
X0,B,W,µ
t and F
X0,W,µ
T
are conditionally independent given FX0,W,µt . Thus, if (Λ
′
t)t∈[0,T ] is (F
X0,B,W,µ
t )t∈[0,T ]-progressively
measurable, then σ(Λ′s : s ≤ t) is conditionally independent of F
X0,W,µ
T given F
X0,W,µ
t , and condition
(5) of Definition 3.1 implies that EP [Γ(µx,Λ, X)] ≥ EP [Γ(µx,Λ′, X ′)], whereX ′ is defined as in (7.1).
This verifies (5’.a), and so (Ω˜, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P,B,W, µ,Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. At this point, the proof is mostly straightforward. The first claim, regarding
the adaptation of Theorem 2.6, follows immediately from Theorem 2.6 and the observation of Lemma
7.1. The second claim, about adapting Theorem 2.11, is not so immediate but requires nothing
new. First, notice that Theorem 6.1 remains true if we replace “weak MFG solution” by “weak
MFG solution without common noise,” and if we define Pn instead by (3.2); this is a consequence
of Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 7.1. Then, we must only check that Proposition 6.2 remains true if we
replace “strong” by “very strong,” and if we replace the conclusion (1) by
(1’) In Pp((Cm)n × Vn × (Cd)n)
lim
k→∞
Pn ◦
(
W,Λk, X [Λk]
)−1
= Pn ◦
(
W,Λ0, X [Λ0]
)−1
.
It is straightforward to check that the proof of Proposition 6.2 given in Section 6.4 translates mutatis
mutandis to this new setting. 
Appendix A. Proof of Propositions 2.4 and 3.3
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.4.
Step 1: We first show that every strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Suppose Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Ann(En) is a strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium on En. Lemma 5.2(3) implies
E
Pn
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λit(da)dt <∞, i = 1, . . . , n.
Let δ > 0, and find β∗ ∈ An(En) such that
Ji((Λ
−i, β∗)) ≥ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
−i, β))− δ. (A.1)
Lemma 5.2(2) implies EPn
∫ T
0
∫
A |a|
p′β∗t (da)dt <∞. Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (see also Remark 6.5), we
may find a sequence of (Fs,nt )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable A-valued processes (α
k
t )t∈[0,T ] such
that
lim
r→∞
sup
k
E
Pn
∫ T
0
|αkt |
p′1{|αkt |>r}dt = 0, (A.2)
and
Pn ◦ (ξ, B,W, β
∗)−1 = lim
k→∞
Pn ◦
(
ξ, B,W, dtδαkt (da)
)−1
,
in Pp((Rd)n × Cm0 × (Cm)n ×V). Abbreviate βk = dtδαkt (da). Since Λ is a strong strategy, we may
write Λ = Λ̂(ξ, B,W ) for some measurable function Λ̂, and it follows (e.g. from [29, Lemma A.3],
which deals with the potential discontinuity of Λ̂) that
Pn ◦
(
ξ, B,W, (Λ−i, β∗)
)−1
= lim
k→∞
Pn ◦
(
ξ, B,W, (Λ−i, βk)
)−1
, (A.3)
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Lemma 6.6 gives
Pn ◦
(
ξ, B,W, (Λ−i, β∗), X [(Λ−i, β∗)]
)−1
= lim
k→∞
Pn ◦
(
ξ, B,W, (Λ−i, βk), X [(Λ−i, βk)]
)−1
.
Hence, the uniform integrability (A.2) and continuity of J of Lemma 4.5 imply
lim
k→∞
Ji((Λ
−i, βk)) = Ji((Λ
−i, β∗)). (A.4)
Finally, since Λ is a strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium, it holds for each k that
Ji(Λ) + ǫi ≥ sup
β∈An(En) strong
Ji
(
(Λ−i, β)
)
≥ Ji
(
(Λ−i, βk)
)
.
Thus, sending k →∞ and applying (A.1) yields
Ji(Λ) + ǫi ≥ Ji
(
(Λ−i, β∗)
)
≥ sup
β∈An(En)
Ji((Λ
−i, β))− δ.
Sending δ ↓ 0 shows that Λ is in fact a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium. 
Step 2: The proof that every strict ǫ-Nash is a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium follows the same structure;
the only difference is that we construct the sequence αk from β∗ a bit differently. First, let ιk : A→ A
be a measurable function satisfying ιk(a) = a for |a| ≤ k and |ιk(a)| ≤ k for all a ∈ A. Let
β˜kt := β
∗
t ◦ ι
−1
k , so that β˜
k → β∗ a.s., and clearly∫
{|a|>r}
|a|p
′
β˜kt (da) ≤
∫
{|a|>r}
|a|p
′
β∗t (da), r > 0. (A.5)
For each k, apply the well-known Chattering Lemma [25, Theorem 2.2(b)] to find a sequence of
(Fnt )t∈[0,T ]-progressively measurable A-valued processes α
k,j
t such that
β˜k = lim
j→∞
dtδαk,jt
(da), a.s. (A.6)
We then find a subsequence jk such that β
k := dtδ
α
k,jk
t
(da) converges a.s. to β∗, and (A.3) holds.
It follows also from (A.5) and (A.6) that
lim
r→∞
sup
k,j
E
Pn
∫ T
0
|αk,jt |
p′1{|αk,jt |>r}
dt = 0,
so that (A.4) holds as well. The rest of the proof is as in Step 1.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3.3. First, note that when σ0 ≡ 0, Lemma 6.6 holds true when the
common noise B is omitted everywhere it appears. With this in mind, the proof of Proposition
3.3 follows exactly Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2.4, except of course with the word “strong”
replaced by “very strong,” and with the common noise B removed everywhere it appears.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 5.3
This proof is similar to the proofs of [11, Proposition B.2] and [29, Proposition B.4]. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ n and P ∈ Qκn,i, apply the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and the growth assumption
to find a constant C > 0 (which will change from line to line but depends only on c, T , and p′) such
that
E
P [‖X‖p
′
t ] ≤CE
P
[
|X0|
p′ +
(∫ t
0
∫
A
|B(s, a)|Λs(da)ds
)p′
+
(∫ t
0
∣∣ΣΣ⊤(s)∣∣ ds)p′/2]
≤C E
{
1 + |X0|
p′ + Zp
′
+
∫ t
0
(
‖X‖p
′
s +
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λs(da)
)
ds
}
,
where we used also p′ ≥ 2 and Jensen’s inequality. By Gronwall’s inequality,
E
P [‖X‖p
′
T ] ≤ CE
P
[
1 + |X0|
p′ + Zp
′
+
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt
]
≤ C(1 + κn,i).
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Thus
sup
P∈Q
E
P [‖X‖p
′
T ] = sup
n
sup
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pi [‖X‖p
′
T ] : Pi ∈ Qκn,i for i = 1, . . . , n
}
≤ C sup
n
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1 + κn,i) <∞. (B.1)
By assumption, we have also
sup
P∈Q
E
P
∫ T
0
∫
A
|a|p
′
Λt(da)dt ≤ sup
n
1
n
n∑
i=1
κn,i <∞. (B.2)
In light of (B.1) and (B.2), it suffices to show that {P ◦ X−1 : P ∈ Q} ⊂ P(Cd) is tight; see [29,
Proposition B.3]. To check this, we will verify Aldous’ criterion [23, Lemma 16.12] for tightness, or
lim
δ↓0
sup
P∈Q
sup
τ
E
P [|X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ |
p] = 0, (B.3)
where the supremum is over stopping times τ valued in [0, T ]. The Burkholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality implies that there exists a constant C′ > 0 (which again depends only on c, T , and p and
will change from line to line) such that, for any i and any P ∈ Qκn,i ,
E
P [|X(τ+δ)∧T −Xτ |
p] ≤ C′EP
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
∫
A
B(t, a)Λt(da)dt
∣∣∣∣∣
p
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
dt|Σ(t)|2
∣∣∣∣∣
p/2

≤ C′EP
[∣∣∣∣∣c
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
(
1 + |Xt|+ Z +
∫
A
|a|Λt(da)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
p]
+ C′EP
∣∣∣∣∣c
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
(1 + |Xt|
pσ + Zpσ ) dt
∣∣∣∣∣
p/2

≤ C′EP
[
(δp + δp/2) (1 + ‖X‖pT + Z
p) +
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
∫
A
|a|Λt(da)dt
∣∣∣∣∣
p]
.
Since p′ > p, we have EP [Zp] ≤ EP [Zp
′
]p/p
′
≤ κ
p/p′
n,i for P ∈ Qκn,i , and thus by assumption
sup
P∈Q
E
P [Zp] = sup
n
sup
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
Pi [Zp] : Pi ∈ Qκn,i for i = 1, . . . , n
}
≤ sup
n
1
n
n∑
i=1
κ
p/p′
n,i <∞.
This and (B.1) imply
lim
δ↓0
sup
P∈Q
(δp + δp/2)EP [1 + ‖X‖pT + Z
p] = 0.
To control the term with Λ, note that p′ > p and (B.2) imply
lim
δ↓0
sup
P∈Q
sup
τ
E
P
∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
∫
A
|a|pΛt(da)dt = 0.
Putting this all together proves (B.3). 
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